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This work presents an empirical evaluation of applicability of selected existing IP security and mobility
mechanisms to lightweight mobile devices and network components with limited resources and capabilities.
In particular, we consider the Host Identity Protocol (HIP), recently specified by the IETF for achieving
authentication, secure mobility and multihoming, data protection and prevention of several types of attacks.
HIP uses the Diffie-Hellman protocol to establish a shared secret for two hosts, digital signatures to provide
integrity of control plane and IPsec ESP encryption to protect user data. These computationally expensive
operations might easily stress CPU, memory and battery resources of a lightweight client, as well as
negatively affect data throughput and latency.
We describe our porting experience with HIP on an embedded Linux PDA, a Symbian-based smartphone
and two OpenWrt Wi-Fi access routers, thereby contributing to the protocol deployment. We present a set of
measurement results of different HIP operations on these devices and evaluate the impact of public-key
cryptography on the processor load, memory usage and battery lifetime, as well as the influence of the IPsec
encryption on Round-Trip Time and TCP throughput. In addition, we assess how the lightweight hardware
of a mobile handheld or a Wi-Fi access router in turn affects the duration of certain protocol operations
including HIP base exchange, HIP mobility update, puzzle solving procedure and generation of an
asymmetric key pair. After analyzing the empirical results we make conclusions and recommendations on
applicability of unmodified HIP and IPsec to resource-constrained mobile devices. We also survey related
work and draw parallels with our own research results.
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1 Introduction
In this thesis we present an evaluation of applicability of existing IP security and
mobility mechanisms for lightweight mobile devices with limited resources and ca-
pabilities. The following sections introduce to the reader the nature of the research
problem, specify our contribution and describe the organization of the thesis.
1.1 IP technology goes embedded
Migration of mobile telecommunication systems to IP technology is a growing, well
recognized trend. The existing mobile devices such as PDAs and smartphones are
increasingly utilizing the TCP/IP communication stack to interconnect between
each other and transfer data. However, the traditional Internet has donated to its
mobile counterpart not only a set of technologies but also a number of research issues
associated with the efficient use of these technologies. Moreover, the scale of the
problems in the new wireless and mobile environment, which has different properties
and requirements, has dramatically increased. In particular, such environment,
compared to wired and stationary communications systems, is a) more prone to
the attacks and b) requires that terminals are mobile. This in turn denotes two
main essential attributes for a device operating in the mobile Internet: security and
mobility, or secure mobility.
A natural way to address these issues would be to borrow the existing solutions that
have proved to work on conventional computers. As an example, there are several
projects that successfully miniaturized the TCP/IP stack and made it perfectly
suited for the micro-systems with only few hundreds bytes of available RAM [19, 17].
However, these solutions have been so far concentrating on the communications
performance and general ability to run IP on tiny objects rather than on reliable
security and mobility support. Mobility has not been in focus during the design of
the original Internet, whereas modern network-layer security mechanisms often rely
on cryptography, which involves computationally-intensive operations that might
stress the resource-constrained devices.
Within the context of this thesis, we call “resource-constrained”, “limited”, “re-
stricted” or “lightweight” such communication devices that are mobile and battery-
powered and have limited computational resources compared to conventional laptops
and desktop computers. Such devices are PDAs, cellular phones, Internet tablets,
communicators etc. The target mobile devices in this work have the CPU clock
1
2rate ranging from 220 to 369 MHz, the amount of RAM ranging from 64 to 96 MB
and the battery capacity ranging from 860 to 1500 mAh. As an additional class of
“lightweight” devices in this thesis, we experiment with small network components
such as Wi-Fi access routers with a 183-MHz CPU and 16 MB of RAM.
1.2 TCP/IP challenges on lightweight mobile devices
The TCP/IP communication stack provides full functionality for interconnecting
mobile devices and transferring data between them. However, initially constructed
for stationary computers several decades ago, today TCP/IP technologies have little
or no capabilities to cope with the new issues introduced by the mobile Internet and
the lightweight portable devices with limited hardware capabilities.
A well known problem with the existing TCP/IP stack running on mobile devices
is that being borrowed from the traditional stationary Internet it does not provide
means for seamless mobility when a client changes its network attachment point.
This results in broken connections, delays, and inability to deliver services to moving
entities.
Another crucial aspect of mobile devices is communication security, which is espe-
cially threatened in wireless networks vulnerable to a variety of attacks. Despite
of many proposed security mechanisms, it is not obvious how efficient they are on
lightweight mobile devices in the presence of limited computational and battery
resources.
1.3 Thesis contribution
Our key contribution in this thesis is the evaluation of the applicability of IP-based
security and mobility to lightweight mobile device such as cellular phones, Internet
tablets and Wi-Fi access routers. In other words, our goal is to assess how feasible
it is to run the existing security and mobility solutions on these classes of devices.
Our interest is especially generated by the use of cryptography that is often a major
part of security and mobility architecture intended to authenticate mobile Internet
hosts, protect communications between them, and defend from potential attacks.
Such operations, as encryption and public key signatures implemented in software,
are computationally-intensive and could stress CPU and battery resources of mobile
devices.
3As a basis for our empirical evaluation we use the Host Identity Protocol (HIP),
which is an experimental secure mobility protocol specified by the IETF [71, 73,
47, 63, 62, 80, 79]. HIP can be fairly considered as a universal solution to many
Internet problems as it provides support of end-to-end security, resistance to CPU
and memory exhausting denial-of-service (DoS) attacks, NAT traversal, mobility
and multihoming. HIP uses the Diffie-Hellman protocol to create a session key for
two communicating hosts and IPsec encapsulation for data packets.
A good property of HIP from the research and experimentation perspective is that
it relies on public-key cryptography and IPsec. This makes HIP similar to other
security and mobility protocols and, thus, provides an opportunity to correlate mea-
surement results obtained in this work with other projects. On the other hand, as
HIP builds its operations on cryptographic identities, its integration with other se-
curity protocols becomes easier [29]. With all its advantages, HIP is a prospective
candidate to be an essential part of the future Internet architecture.
Although several previous projects evaluated HIP on standard Internet hosts [40,
38, 82, 48], none of the studies has targeted a HIP assessment on a mobile device
with restricted resources. In this work, we perform HIP measurements on real mo-
bile devices: Linux-based Internet tablets and Symbian-based smartphones. The
extensive analysis of the results allows us to provide a set of recommendations on
using unmodified HIP on lightweight clients in varying circumstances. Our expe-
rience with HIP reported in this thesis is of particular importance to the Internet
research community. This is because HIP is still an experimental protocol and for
large-scale deployment it needs more success stories and real-life pilot examples.
Another contribution of this work is a HIP-based distributed authentication archi-
tecture that addresses important security and mobility issues in wireless local area
networks. To validate our model we build a pilot WLAN with two models of Wi-Fi
access routers that have varying hardware resources. We evaluate performance of
selected public-key operations on these Wi-Fi access routers. This assessment al-
lows to determine a set of criteria for selecting equipment while deploying such an
architecture in different networks.
We further contribute to the security and mobility issues on lightweight devices by
surveying related work and drawing appropriate parallels with our own research
results.
As an additional contribution, we consider our first-hand knowledge about migration
of open source software (OSS) projects to mobile environment. In particular, we
report our porting experience of two different HIP implementations to Symbian
4OS, as well as migration of HIPL to an embedded Linux OS and to the OpenWrt
platform.
1.4 Thesis structure
The structure of the thesis is organized as follows. In Chapter 2, we overview re-
lated technologies from the security and mobility fields. In addition, we present the
background on the Host Identity Protocol that has been the target of our empirical
research. Chapter 3 surveys the most interesting pieces of related work found in the
literature. Chapter 4 and Chapter 5 describe the nature of the research problem
and research methodology. In Chapter 6, we present performance evaluation of HIP
on Nokia 770 Internet Tablet. The chapter contains description of our port of HIPL
and protocol performance results on the mobile Internet tablet. In particular, our
measurements include data throughput, latency, and power consumption of a HIP
base exchange and a HIP mobility update. Chapter 7 describes our experience of
running HIP on Symbian OS and evaluates feasibility of running IP-based secu-
rity on lightweight cellular phones. We measure and analyze duration of the HIP
base exchange and its parts, CPU load, RAM utilization and power consumption of
several protocol operations on Nokia E51 and Nokia N80. The chapter elaborates
on the porting process of two HIP implementations, HIPL and OpenHIP, to Sym-
bian OS. Chapter 8 presents our authentication architecture in wireless LANs and
reports performance results of its components running on two Wi-Fi AR models,
La Fonera FON2100 and Gateworks Avila GW2348-4. We summarize the empirical
results, discuss the outcome of our research and highlight potential future research
directions in Chapter 9. Finally, Chapter 10 concludes the thesis.
2 Background
This chapter presents a brief overview of several related to our research concepts and
definitions from the IP security and mobility fields. It does not intend to provide
details but rather aims at helping the reader in understanding selected ideas, terms
and techniques.
2.1 IP security
The aim of IP security in general is to protect network-layer communications be-
tween the hosts in the Internet. The main components of IP security include authen-
tication, authorization, privacy, confidentiality, protection of data integrity, and pre-
vention of a variety of attacks by means of the different protocols and mechanisms.
In the following sections we give an overview of several security techniques, including
symmetric, public-key and elliptic curve cryptography. Cryptography mechanisms
in communications systems are used to ensure data integrity and confidentiality by
encrypting the messages sent over an insecure channel and to authenticate their
originator by signing the messages digitally. The encrypted pieces of the data are
usually referred to as ciphertext, whilst the algorithms to perform encryption and
decryption operations are known as ciphers. Ciphertexts themselves make little
sense to an entity that is not able to decrypt them and, therefore, are usually safe
to transmit them over an insecure network. Digital signatures, in turn, allow to
verify the authenticity of a message originator to its receivers [14, 16, 89, 93]. Be-
low we give a short overview of the most prominent cryptography algorithms and
protocols consolidated in three different groups, symmetric cryptography, public-key
cryptography and elliptic curve cryptography.
2.1.1 Symmetric cryptography
To perform encryption and decryption operations the sender and receiver of a mes-
sage have to employ a key. In symmetric cryptography, either this key is identical
for both encryption and decryption or derivation of one key from another is triv-
ial. Thus, for confidential communication, the symmetric key must not be revealed
to any third party. This makes the key management process very challenging. The
main questions are how to securely select a cryptographic key, how to distribute it to
both communicating parties and how to store the key safely on the hosts. However,
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6the complexity of managing the keys in symmetric cryptography is compensated by
relatively low computational cost comparing to other encryption algorithms such
as public-key cryptography. Two types of the ciphers utilized in symmetric cryp-
tography are stream and block ciphers. Stream ciphers encrypt bits of a message
one by one, whereas block ciphers divide the message on blocks of different size and
operate on them [14]. Examples of the most known block cipher methods used with
symmetric cryptography are DES (Data Encryption Standard) [74], AES (Advance
Encryption Standard) [76], and Blowfish [91].
2.1.2 Public-key cryptography
Public-key cryptography also known as asymmetric cryptography uses an approach
different from symmetric cryptography. The key idea is built around a pair of the
keys, public and private, that complement each other and are generated together
on a host. The public key is open to anyone and is distributed among the host’s
peers. The peers that want to communicate with the host use its public key to
encrypt the messages. These messages can only be decrypted using the correspond-
ing private key of a public-private key pair. Since the private key is kept secretly
on the host possessing it, asymmetric cryptography provides high level of commu-
nication security and data protection. One of the main properties of asymmetric
cryptography is that the private key cannot be practically derived from its public
counterpart [16, 89].
Public-key cryptography allows not only to preserve communication privacy between
a host and its peers by making it impossible to read transferred information by the
third parties but can also be used to digitally sign messages. A public-key signature
tightly binds a message with its originator and proves that a particular message has
been signed by a particular host. Having signed a message its sender cannot repu-
diate its actions, i.e. refuse its involvement in creating the message. Practically this
means that after the message had been signed the host cannot change the message
content without modifying its signature and vice versa [89]. A downside of public
key cryptography is that the algorithms it uses operate on large numbers, involve
heavy mathematical calculations and, thus, produce significant cost to communi-
cating hosts. This limits the applicability of the public-key algorithms, especially
in cases when one or more of the communicating parties is a lightweight mobile
host with constrained hardware resources. In practise, asymmetric and symmetric
cryptography algorithms are often utilized jointly. First, public key cryptography
is used to securely establish a shared secret between two hosts. Then, the hosts
7can employ this shared secret in symmetric cryptography algorithms that are more
efficient computationally [14].
RSA
RSA algorithm [89] received its name from the initial letters of surnames of its
original inventors, Rivest, Shamir and Adleman. In 1978 they published an encryp-
tion method to achieve privacy and authentication in electronic communications
systems, which later had become one of the commonly used cipher methods in
public-key cryptography. With this method, constructed on the complexity of fac-
toring large prime numbers, it is computationally difficult to derive the private part
of a public-private key pair by knowing its public component. Thus, it becomes
possible to eliminate the secrecy of the public key while distributing it over an in-
secure channel. Encryption of the messages with the public key of a host allows
to protect integrity of transmitted data (that may include symmetric keys as well),
while signing the messages with the private key authenticates the host to its peers.
More details about the RSA algorithm can be found in [89].
DSA
DSA is an acronym for Digital Signature Algorithm, which is a standard published
by the US National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) in 2000. As the
name suggests, DSA can be used to digitally sign messages whilst it cannot be used
to perform data encryption. The full standard specification can be found in [75].
Diffie-Hellman
Diffie-Hellman (DH) [16] is a key exchange protocol introduced by Whitfield Diffie
and Martin E. Hellman in 1976. The protocol is an example of the common use of
the public-key and symmetric cryptography algorithms to solve the key distribution
problem in the cryptosystems. The DH protocol can be used together with RSA
and DSA algorithms to securely exchange the keys of two communicating hosts and
eventually generate a pairwise secret. This secret is subsequently used to derive a
common session key used in actual data communication between these hosts [16].
8Table 2.1: Comparable key sizes with different cryptosystems. Adapted from [13].
Symmetric ECC DSA/RSA “Best Before”
80 160 1024 2010
112 224 2048 2030
128 256 3072 2040
192 384 7680 2080
256 512 15360 2120
2.1.3 Elliptic Curve Cryptography
An approach to use elliptic curves in cryptography as an alternative to the existing
public-key algorithms (in particular, the Diffie-Hellman protocol) has been proposed
by Victor Miller in 1985 [70]. The main author’s emphasis was that Elliptic Curve
Cryptography (ECC) could achieve more efficient computation comparing to the
DH protocol. Neal Koblitz is another famous scientist well known for his valuable
contribution to the ECC field (e.g., [55, 56]). Along with Miller, he is referred to as
one of the ECC’s originators. The strength of the ECC idea lies on the elliptic curve
discrete logarithm problem (ECDLP), which in this case is much harder to solve
computationally than with the ECC’s counterparts. Largely for this reason, ECC is
often being called as a “new generation” of public-key cryptography. Although with
present requirements to security levels it does not bring much efficiency comparing
to the “mainstream” algorithms such as DH or RSA, ECC is believed to provide
significant benefits for future communications systems when the security threats
will be multiplied from their current level. One particular advantage of ECC is that
it requires notably shorter key length than RSA and DH while claiming to preserve
an equivalent security level (see Table 2.1). In other words, computation cost per
bit is rapidly decreasing for ECC with increasing the public key length. Presently
used RSA/DSA cryptosystems still often employ the key length of 1024 bits, which
is considered to remain “unbreakable” until 2010 [13].
Looking at the current ECC implementation and deployment status one can ob-
serve serious implications. The biggest obstacle is that the majority of ECC-related
techniques and aspects have been patented by numerous individuals and companies,
9which substantially differentiates ECC from the rest of the cryptography methods.
One notable player in this area is a Canadian company Certicom that holds over
100 patents concerned to ECC and public-key cryptography in general [77]. Ac-
cording to Certicom web site4, since the introduction of ECC in 1985 the company
has been continuously seeking to develop an efficient implementation of ECC and
break a common belief in its relative slowness. As a result, Certicom has deliv-
ered a commercial ECC toolkit that can be used in numerous applications. Other
interesting initiatives of Certicom include sponsoring of the Center for Advanced
Cryptographic Research (CACR) at the University of Waterloo along with several
annual ECC scientific venues for the world’s key cryptographers and organizing
since 1997 the Certicom ECC Challenge5, which gives practically to anyone an op-
portunity to solve the ECDLP at its current level. Participants of the challenge
are supposed to derive the ECC private keys based on the list of the public keys
and other known parameters. As of now, the highest solved challenges are 109-bit.
The 131-bit challenge requires much more resources to be solved whereas higher
challenges (starting from 163-bit) are treated as computationally infeasible.
Besides mentioned activities, Certicom has formed the Standards for Efficient Cryp-
tography Group (SECG)6 that combines core providers of cryptography solutions
seeking for interoperability between them. Among other, the SECG has been pro-
ducing a number of ECC standards and documents including“SEC 1: Elliptic Curve
Cryptography” [13] and “SEC 2: Recommended Elliptic Curve Domain Parame-
ters” [12]. Despite of complex IPR issues around ECC, several countries around the
world are adopting an extent of it via licensing. For instance, the National Security
Agency (NSA) has purchased from Certicom the rights to use a set of ECC tech-
niques under patents believing in their strong future potential. The US Department
of Defense (DoD) is targeting to replace around 1.3 million existing hardware devices
within a time frame of ten years. The goal is to ensure that future communication
systems will be capable of protecting sensitive information for the US government
and country [77]. Section 3.1 of this thesis surveys some relevant studies on ECC
security on mobile devices.
4http://www.certicom.com/index.php/ecc
5http://www.certicom.com/index.php/the-certicom-ecc-challenge
6http://www.secg.org
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2.2 IP mobility
Mobility is one of the essential attributes of today’s Internet users and networks.
Especially, the owners of mobile lightweight devices, such as cell phones and laptops,
tend to change their geographical location that often causes changes of their network
attachment point and their IP addresses. Other possible scenarios include switching
application sessions between different hardware terminals and moving the whole
networks at once. Mobility in general can be classified into different types depending
on various factors, for example, which of the aforementioned changes are needed to
be sustained, or which layer of the OSI reference model is in focus. Most of the
authors working in the area of mobility distinguish between terminal, network, flow,
session, personal, and service mobility [59, 67, 92, 107].
2.2.1 Mobility types
Terminal or host mobility implies uninterrupted TCP/IP connections in the presence
of node mobility, i.e. upon changing its physical location and/or IP address [67, 92,
107]. Network mobility provides means to sustain moving of a complete network
with its mobile access router and maintain reachability to all of the mobile nodes
inside the network [15, 67, 107]. Flow mobility allows splitting parts of a connection
between distinct interfaces of a host, as well as switching a communication between
IPv4 and IPv6 protocols [107]. Session mobility denotes an ability to seamlessly
move versatile communication sessions from one terminal to another, e.g., from a
PDA to a PC, or from a laptop to a smartphone [92]. Personal mobility is defined
as a possibility to make the user reachable via a single user identity (e.g., an URI,
an IP address, a cryptographic key) on several physical appliances or several user
identities on a single device, either at the same time or alternatively [92]. Finally,
service mobility is referred to as a means to access personal user services in versatile
circumstances, including changes of client devices and network access providers [92].
2.2.2 Handover types
A comprehensive set of mobility related definitions can be found in [67]. For the
purpose of this thesis, in addition to the above mobility categories, it is necessary
to provide a general definition of a handover. A handover or a handoff is a process
of changing the network attachment point by a host, or an attempt to perform such
a change. The aim of the most IP mobility mechanisms is to provide functionality
that would allow to minimize session breaks and interruptions during a handoff [67].
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When a change of the network attachment point is unnoticed by the user, the
respective handover is often referred to as seamless. Handovers might differ by the
scope (e.g., horizontal or vertical) and by the level of control (e.g., mobile-controlled
or network-controlled). Horizontal handoff defines the process of switching the
network attachment point of a mobile node between access points of the same type
(e.g., WLAN to WLAN). In contrast, during a vertical handover a mobile device
moves from one access network type to another, such as from WLAN to 3G. These
and other definitions of handoff types can be found in [67].
2.2.3 Mobility at different layers
Different aspects of mobility have been extensively studied to date resulting in a
wide range of mobility protocols and extensions that aim to operate on different,
from link to application, layers of the OSI reference model [10, 46, 57, 59, 79, 84,
88, 97, 106, 107]. Sometimes, the distinction of the mobility mechanisms between
different protocol stack layers is blurred. For instance, network (IP) layer mobility
can be made transparent to upper layers, whereas network-layer applications can be
assisted by application-layer mobility mechanisms. Resulting from this tendency, a
number of combined protocol schemes for multi-layered mobility management have
been proposed to date [95, 101, 102].
In this work, as the name suggests, we mostly consider IP-layer mobility that, in
terms of the presented definitions, best refers to terminal or host mobility. In
Chapter 3, we review related work in the area of IP mobility that has been following
different approaches including locator/identifier split. Section 2.3 below provides
background information on the Host Identity Protocol, which follows the latter
approach and has been the key technology in the experimental part of this thesis.
2.3 Host Identity Protocol
The existing Internet architecture that had been primarily designed for stationary
hosts nowadays faces many non-trivial challenges with the growing amount of mo-
bile terminals. Currently, there are two name spaces that are used globally by the
Internet services and applications, domain names and IP addresses. IP addresses
serve the dual role in the Internet being both end host identifiers and topological
locators. This general principle does not allow hosts to change their location with-
out breaking ongoing transport protocol connections that are strictly bound to IP
addresses.
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2.3.1 HIP architecture
The Host Identity Protocol (HIP) [47, 62, 63, 71, 73, 79, 80] had been proposed
to overcome the above mentioned problem. The idea behind HIP is decoupling
of the network layer from the higher layers in the protocol stack architecture (see
Figure 2.1). HIP defines a new global name space, the Host Identity name space,
thereby splitting the double meaning of the IP addresses. When HIP is used, upper
layers do not any more rely on IP addresses as host names. Instead, Host Identifiers
are used in the transport protocol headers for identifying hosts and establishing
connections. IP addresses at the same time act purely as locators and are respon-
sible for routing packets towards the destination. A Host Identifier is a public key
of the host. For compatibility with IPv6 legacy applications and to ease protocol
implementations, a Host Identifier is further represented by a 128-bit long crypto-
graphic hash, the Host Identity Tag (HIT). Each HIP-enabled host has one or more
host identifiers that might be either public (available from a directory service) or
unpublished (local).
HIP offers several benefits including end-to-end security, resistance to CPU and
memory exhausting denial-of-service (DoS) attacks, NAT traversal, mobility and
multihoming support.
2.3.2 Base exchange
To start communicating through HIP, two entities must establish a HIP association.
This process is known as the HIP Base Exchange (BEX) [71, 73] and it consists of
four messages transferred between the initiator and the responder. After BEX is
successfully completed, both hosts are confident that private keys corresponding to
Host Identifiers (public keys) are indeed possessed by their peers. Another purpose
of the HIP base exchange is to create a pair of IPsec Encapsulated Security Payload
(ESP) Security Associations (SAs), one for each direction. All subsequent traffic
between communicating parts is protected by IPsec. A new IPsec ESP mode, Bound
End-to-end Tunnel (BEET) [81] is used in HIP. The main advantage of BEET mode
is low overhead in contrast to the regular tunnel mode.
Figure 2.1 illustrates the overall HIP architecture including the BEX. The initiator
can retrieve the HI/HIT of the responder from a DNS directory [80] by sending a
FQDN in a DNS query. Instead of resolving the FQDN to an IP address, the DNS
server replies with an HI (FQDN→HI). Transport layer creates a packet with the
HI as the destination point identifier. During the next step, HI is mapped to an
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Figure 2.1: HIP architecture.
IP address by the HIP daemon on the Host Identity layer. Finally, the packet is
processed by the network layer and delivered to the responder. As a result, the
conventional 5-tuple socket becomes {protocol, source HI, source port, destination
HI, destination port}.
2.3.3 Mobility and multihoming
Since neither transport layer connections nor security associations (SAs) created
after the HIP base exchange are bound to IP addresses, a mobile client can change
its IP address (upon moving, due to a DHCP lease or IPv6 router advertisement) and
keep on transmitting ESP-protected packets to its peer. HIP supports such mobility
events by implementing an end-to-end signaling mechanism between communicating
nodes (see Figure 2.2) [79].
The purpose of the first UPDATE packet is to notify the peer of a new IP address and
ESP information associated with this address. The corresponding parameters are
called LOCATOR and ESP INFO. The message also contains a SEQ parameter (a
sequence number of the packet) and is therefore protected against possible losses by
retransmission. Upon receiving the UPDATE message, the peer host must validate
it, update any local HI↔IP mappings and assure that the mobile client is accessible
via the new link. This is accomplished by sending the second UPDATE packet back
to the mobile host at its new IP address containing an echo request along with the
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Figure 2.2: HIP mobility update.
ESP INFO of the peer. Finally, the mobile client is expected to acknowledge the
message from its peer and return the content of the echo message. When the peer
host gets this response, the new IP address of the client is marked as verified and
the update procedure is completed [79].
In some cases a host might have more than one IP addresses associated with a
certain interface or even several interfaces attached to different access points. Such
host is often referred to as multihomed and is able to maintain multiple connections
over distinct paths. HIP provides an opportunity for a host to inform its peers
about available interfaces through the use of signalling messages described above.
The peer hosts update the appropriate HI↔IP bindings and verify each of the IP
addresses of the multihomed host by sending echo requests and waiting for correct
replies.
The base specification of HIP mobility and multihoming is presented in the
RFC 5206 [79]. Besides that, several extensions have been proposed over past years
in research to complement HIP with micromobility [84, 96, 108] and network mo-
bility [41, 85] support. Some of these studies are mentioned under related work in
Section 3.2.
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2.4 Symbian OS networking architecture
A part of our research is devoted to performance evaluation of the Host Identity
Protocol on Symbian OS S60 smartphones. This section gives to the reader brief
details about Symbian networking architecture important from the perspective of
porting an open source software (OSS) to it.
Symbian OS networking architecture is dominantly based on the client-server com-
munication model. Applications written as clients usually connect to and exchange
data with particular servers (socket, telephony, serial communications, etc.). A
server then communicates with low-level entities such as logical and physical device
drivers (LDD and PDD) via an interface of server plug-in modules. Different mod-
ule types include CSY (serial communications server), TSY (telephony server), PRT
(socket server), and MTM (message type) modules. Clients do not directly access
the plug-in modules. The latter are instead loaded by the server on demand [24].
The socket server (ESOCK) is responsible for socket APIs on Symbian and provides
two types of interfaces: a BSD-like C socket API (based on Open C plug-in [27])
and an alternative Symbian-native C++ socket API. The socket server works with
PRT protocol modules that are supplied in a form of dynamic link libraries (DLLs)
with a .PRT extension. The TCPIP.PRT module comprises support of IPv4/v6,
ICMP, TCP and UDP, as well as DNS infrastructure [24].
Our HIP implementation for Symbian OS is entirely based on the Open C plug-in
that provides support of many standard C socket APIs. The Open C plug-in serves
as an interface between the HIP daemon application and the PRT protocol modules
in the Symbian networking stack.
3 Related Work
A number of studies evaluated different network-layer security and mobility mech-
anisms running on traditional computers [38, 48, 107]. Several research projects
studied security aspects of communications in sensor networks from the perspec-
tive of tiny participating nodes [31, 100]. Other studies were devoted to protection
of sensitive health care data being transferred between remote monitoring mobile
devices [66]. This section highlights interesting related research performed on IP
security and mobility, focusing on mobile lightweight devices.
3.1 Studies on IP security
In the following sections we survey several research studies that aimed at securing
IP layer communications of mobile devices by means of elliptic curve, symmetric
and asymmetric cryptography. We also give a word to some alternative approaches
such as those using hash chains and overview the Internet Key Exchange protocol.
3.1.1 Elliptic Curve Cryptography
Malhotra et al. [66] evaluated the use of Elliptic-Curve Cryptography (ECC) to pro-
tect sensitive health data in a patient monitoring system on a PDA. The authors
propose a secure protocol that aims at data encryption and user authentication.
According to theoretical background given by the authors, ECC has a great advan-
tage over RSA security algorithms because it consumes less memory and processing
time. As an example, a 1024-bits RSA key’s size would be equivalent to the size
of a 160-bits ECC key. This, in authors’ opinion emphasizes benefits of using ECC
on constrained mobile devices [66]. Unfortunately, besides referring to other studies
in the ECC field, the authors do not provide empirical comparison results between
ECC and public-key cryptography that would have been useful to evaluate different
schemes on lightweight devices. However, the article is valuable as it shows some
particular performance results of ECC on a PDA SPV M5000 running at 520 MHz
with 64 MB of RAM. Interestingly, even with such considerable hardware resources
for a mobile device, ECC encryption over WLAN and 3G produced notable latency
compared to plain data communications. As the results indicate, the total time to
communicate a small text message over the implemented ECC protocol varies from
8 seconds in WLAN to 11 seconds in 3G network. ECC signature verification takes
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on the average 6-7 seconds of the total time. ECC security algorithm over WLAN in
this example study brings a 16-fold overhead comparing to non-ECC case (8 versus
0.5 seconds) [66].
3.1.2 Symmetric versus public-key cryptography
Continuing from the previous section on Elliptic Curve Cryptography, a work by
Wang et al. [100] presents a comparison between symmetric cryptography and ECC-
based public-key cryptography in sensors networks. The main objective of Wang
et al. in this study was to address important security aspects of large wireless sensor
networks with tiny sensor nodes, such as user authentication and data access control.
Namely, the authors aim at achieving protection from several attack types includ-
ing message eavesdropping, traffic monitoring, sensor compromising and flooding
attacks. They design a set of asymmetric and symmetric cryptography schemes
for establishing a shared key between communicating entities and compared them
on commercially available MICAz pairwise sensor motes. These devices include a
8-MHz CPU, 128K of flash memory and 4K of RAM. In the experiments the au-
thors evaluate a pairwise key establishment process and authentication of a mobile
user to a sensor mote from the perspectives of processing time, memory overhead,
the amount of transferred messages (message complexity) and energy consumption.
Based on the performance results obtained in several tests, Wang et al. conclude
that ECC-based public-key cryptography has more advantages over symmetric cryp-
tography in terms of message complexity, use of the memory and security [100].
A recent study by Haque et al. [31] introduces a public-key based mechanism to
protect node-to-node communications in wireless sensor networks. In particular, the
authors consider a healthcare system scenario where small sensors transmit sensitive
data between each other and to mobile terminals, with the help of a secure base
station. The presented approach comprises two components: a) a key negotiation
scheme to generate a shared secret between a sensor node and the secure base
station; b) a decryption key derivation mechanism used by a receiver node for each
particular sender. In this scheme, the secure base station serves as a key generation
and management entity. It first establishes a pairwise session key with the sender
of a message, which is used for message encryption, and then securely transmits a
correspondent decryption key for this message to the receiver. Based on simulation,
the authors compare their own proposed solution with two other security schemes
in terms of the energy consumed for communications, which is an important metric
in wireless sensor networks. The results indicate that the proposed architecture
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shows better performance than one system, whereas consumes more energy than
another (10.1 mJ for sender and 5.7 mJ for receiver). However, the authors do not
show any estimates for key handshake (based on public-key cryptography) duration
between a sensor node and the base station. Although the system is presented as
a very scalable end-to-end security scheme, each sensor-to-sensor communication
requires establishing a secure context with the central base station, which produces
additional costs.
He and Zhang [32] propose a protocol for asymmetric authentication of end hosts,
one of which is a weak mobile client connected over the air to a wired service
provider in the Internet. The presented approach is based on delegating part of the
computationally expensive cryptographic operations from a mobile client to a third
party that is a representative of the mobile node in its home network. The design
allows to authenticate the mobile client and the service provider to each other via
a home network proxy, whilst not revealing the session key to the latter. While the
idea of using a home agent to achieve an extra functionality for mobile clients is
not novel, the protocol designed by He and Zhang deserves proper attention since
it addresses an essential property such as authentication. On the other hand, a
number of issues remain to be unclear, for instance, potential client movements and
mobility, and the overhead introduced by a home representative. In addition, the
authors mention that running asymmetric cryptography on lightweight devices is
expensive without providing any actual figures [32].
3.1.3 LHIP
Lightweight HIP or LHIP [33, 34] originally derived from the early thoughts on
computational complexity of public-key cryptography in HIP when used on resource-
constrained nodes. The motivation for this work was further reinforced later with
availability of the first empirical HIP measurement results on Nokia 770 Internet
Tablet [54]. In Lightweight HIP, Heer suggests a lightweight authentication exten-
sion for the Host Identity Protocol, which uses hash chains instead of computa-
tionally expensive asymmetric cryptography. LHIP achieves up to two orders of
magnitude reduction of HIP computational cost at the expense of public key au-
thentication, thereby making the protocol more suitable for mobile appliances with
low resource base [33, 34].
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3.1.4 IKE and MOBIKE
Internet Key Exchange version 2 (IKEv2) protocol is standardized in RFC 4306 [50].
The purpose of IKE is to authenticate two communication entities to each other by
exchanging theirs keys and to create a pair of Security Associations (SAs) to be
used then with IPsec (IP security) ESP (Encapsulated Security Payload) and AH
(Authentication Header) protocols [51, 52]. In addition to general IKE specifications,
there has been a number of efforts on how to tailor it to particular needs of embedded
systems (e.g., a lightweight IKE) and mobile environments (e.g., MOBIKE). Lim
et al. [65] aim at integrating IP security into embedded network components, such as
routers. Based on IKEv1 standard, the authors design and implement a lightweight
IKE protocol extension that has a minimal set of standard RFC functions but is
interoperable with other IKE protocols and thus can be used to establish SAs with
different clients. However, since the IKEv1 has been enhanced and obsoleted by
the IKEv2, presented lightweight IKE extension needs to be reimplemented to be
compatible with the latest standards.
MOBIKE [86] is an extension to IKEv2 that provides mobility and multihoming
support so that established IKE SAs can be updated when the IP address of one
participating host changes. In the simple scenario this may happen due to terminal
movements and change of an access network. In a more sophisticated scenario
MOBIKE can support multihoming, i.e., the use of different network interfaces at
the same time, as well as IP interfamily (IPv4 and IPv6) handover. MOBIKE
does not support any rendezvous service and this prevents simultaneous IP address
change on both hosts. This is one important distinction that differentiates MOBIKE
from the Host Identity Protocol [73]. Nevertheless, IKE and HIP have much in
common. Both aim at establishing a secure communication context between two
hosts and generating keying material for subsequent use by IPsec. This generated
substantial interest in functionality comparison and evaluation of security level of
both protocols. Jian et al. propose to replace the HIP base exchange with an IKE
extension as a mechanism to eliminate some security risks [44].
3.2 Research on IP mobility
A number of previous research projects have studied mobility management issues in
next generation wireless networks. Nevertheless, to our best knowledge, there have
been little or no efforts to evaluate performance of different mobility mechanisms
running particularly on lightweight mobile devices taking into account their spe-
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cific constraints and use cases. Such small appliances belong to a group of devices
that, due to their usage patterns, i.e., frequent movements, require strong mobil-
ity support. On the other hand, implementing secure mobility might easily stress
lightweight hardware. Our preliminary experiments with HIP mobility on Nokia 770
presented in Section 6.3.6 indicate that secure mobility produces certain costs to a
mobile handset in terms of computation time, as compared, for instance, with a
conventional laptop.
Thus, we believe that evaluating performance of different mobility extensions on
lightweight hardware is important as it would provide a good basis for choosing
the most appropriate mechanism for a particular type of device and/or application
under particular circumstances. In case of hybrid mobility management concepts
comprising multilayered techniques, it is important to balance computational load
on a mobile client and in general avoid potential overhead, which might derive
from cryptographic operations involved with signalling updates, such as in the Host
Identity Protocol.
3.2.1 Mobile IP and HIP
In this thesis, besides presenting our practical experience with HIP mobility, we find
it necessary to look at the related studies and overview some essential approaches
that make host mobility and multihoming possible. Mobile IP (MIP) [88] has been
around for a long time and, despite of the bottlenecks (such as, e.g., triangular
routing), represents one of the popular approaches to address mobility in the existing
Internet architecture initially designed for stationary hosts. Mobile IP protocol is
intended to run with minimal changes to the present end hosts in the Internet by
introducing a home agent and a foreign agent for a mobile node. These agents
continuously maintain a binding between each other through a tunnel so that the
home agent is always aware of the current IP address of the mobile node via its
foreign agent. Binding updates are performed either upon changing of the network
attachment point by the mobile node or when the binding lifetime has expired. The
mobile node is always identified with its home agent and regardless of any physical
movements and changes of its network attachment point, the IP address of the
mobile node remains the same for respective transport connections. This way IP
mobility performed on the network layer is transparent to the upper layers protocols
and applications [88].
In research, there can be found several comparative studies and performance eval-
uations of different mobility protocols on conventional PCs or laptops. Henderson
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et al. [40] present experience with the Host Identity Protocol from the perspective
of secure mobility and multihoming. The contribution of the paper is significant as
it provides a comprehensive comparison of HIP and other mobility and multihoming
approaches, as well as reports on a HIP pilot performance and identifies directions
for future research. In particular, HIP mobility is compared to the Mobile IPv6 with
“route optimization” from the MIPv6 base specification [46]. The authors highlight
the main differences in mobility procedures such as the use of MIPv6 Binding Update
versus HIP Readdress packets; MIPv6 non-IPsec mode versus HIP tight integration
with IPsec; MIPv6 home agent versus the use of directory services in HIP; MIPv6
subnet mobility versus pure HIP host-centered approach; security of MIPv6 ver-
sus HIP mobility update mechanisms [40]. It is worth mentioning though that the
specifications of both protocols have changed since the publication of this article.
MIPv6 route optimization has been updated by “Enhanced Route Optimization for
Mobile IPv6” [6]. An enhanced procedure benefits from shortening of the handover
latency, raising security and lowering signalling overhead. HIP specifications have
matured to RFCs 5201-5207 and some parameters of the mobility mechanism have
changed, too. For instance, the REA parameter has been substituted by the new
LOCATOR parameter [79]. Besides this, Novaczki et al. [85] have suggested an
approach to network mobility based on HIP, titled HIP-NEMO, thus extending HIP
context from pure host mobility and multihoming.
Jokela et al. in an early work [48] compare performance of a vertical hand-off with
the HIP and the MIPv6 protocols while switching between a WLAN and a GPRS
network. The authors measure a signalling delay in both protocols, starting from
the first update packet and ending with the first recovered packet of a TCP data
stream. In this study, HIP notably outperforms MIPv6 in terms of the average
duration of a mobility update (2.46 versus 8.05 seconds respectively). However,
the authors suggest that in theory both protocols should perform similarly and
explain their empirical results by a bug in the measured MIPv6 implementation
that caused simultaneous use of two interfaces for the same TCP stream (packets
and their ACKs) for a certain time span during the update procedure. This in turn
resulted in overloading of the GPRS link and dropping and retransmitting some
of the MIPv6 signalling packets. In the future, the authors plan to measure other
MIPv6 implementations, as well as the enhancements to the current mobility update
procedures. The work by Jokela et al., however, does not concern the perspective of
the underlying hardware and the types of the communicating hosts we are interested
in. It compares the work of two separate approaches to mobility in practice rather
than evaluates performance of a single protocol on different hardware platforms.
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Nevertheless, the article provides a useful reference material for our research.
3.2.2 Multilayered mobility management
Numerous studies took a multilayered approach to mobility and evaluated feasi-
bility and efficiency of integrating multiple protocols operating on different OSI
layers [9, 28, 64, 49, 95, 101]. Of these, considerable research has been conducted
on combining network layer mobility mechanisms with mobility on the application
layer. The intention of such integration approaches is usually to provide “all-in-one”
mobility support for versatile types of applications, improve QoS and shorten time
needed to perform a handover. For instance, the authors of [64, 49, 101] proposed a
multilayered mobility management approach based on a combination of the Session
Initiation Protocol (SIP) [90] and the Mobile IP.
Schulzrinne and Wedlund [92] describe how SIP signalling provides terminal, ses-
sion, personal, and service mobility for different applications. By drawing a parallel
between SIP and Mobile IP and comparing flexibility provided to users, the au-
thors identify the most favourable scenarios for each protocol and conclude that
application-layer mobility can successfully be a partial substitution or an extension
for network-layer mobility. Despite its well known limitations, MIP is found by the
authors to be more efficient for terminal mobility and TCP connections [92].
Similarly with Mobile IP, HIP has become a candidate protocol to combine it with
SIP for cooperative mobility management on two layers. Henderson [39] discusses
possible integration of SIP and HIP and, among the main benefits, which the latter
protocol might potentially bring to the former, lists resistance to DoS attacks, the
ability to preserve TCP sessions upon an IP address change, better micromobility
management, NAT traversal, and the possibility to integrate some HIP and SIP
components (such as a HIP rendezvous server and a SIP proxy). However, the
author emphasizes that it is not clear whether all mentioned HIP features, due to
their immaturity as of writing the article in 2004, can turn to be advantageous
to SIP in the future [39]. Since the time of the Henderson’s discussion both HIP
and SIP have matured and now open up new perspectives for combining them.
HIP, for example, has been specified in the seven RFCs (5201-5207), including the
specifications for registration, rendezvous, mobility and multihoming, DNS and NAT
traversal extensions. In addition, several proposals have been suggested for HIP
micromobility [84, 96, 108] and network mobility [85, 41] support.
Since Henderson, HIP and SIP integration has been further reflected in research. A
hybrid scheme called SHIP has been suggested by So et al. [95]. Based on experi-
23
Figure 3.1: SHIM6 and HIP layers in the protocol stack.
mental evaluation, the authors show that SHIP outperforms a hybrid MIP and SIP
scheme in terms of signalling overhead and efficiency [95]. A more recent work by
Camarillo et al. introduces a framework for combining SIP and HIP and emphasizes
its advantages [9].
3.2.3 SHIM6
SHIM6 presents an approach that has much in common with the Host Identity Pro-
tocol. The core specification of SHIM6 is presented in the Internet-Draft “Shim6:
Level 3 Multihoming Shim Protocol for IPv6” [83]. The protocol aims at providing
multihoming functionality for IPv6 protocol enabling also reachability and failure
detection mechanisms. With multihoming capability Internet hosts are able to share
their communication loads between different network interfaces. Besides that, when
some of the currently used locators change or stop working, SHIM6 reacts appro-
priately by switching to new locators seamlessly for upper layer applications and
protocols [83].
HIP also provides support for host multihoming using update mechanisms similar
to mobility. HIP is based on the concept of locator-identifier split and, similarly
with SHIM6, introduces a new protocol layer between the network and transport
layers (see Figure 3.1).
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3.3 HIP performance evaluation
In addition to theoretical comparison of mobility approaches, Henderson et al. [40]
present their performance results of HIP running on Dell Latitude laptops. These
results are particularly interesting to us in respect to our own empirical study (see
Chapter 6) because the CPU clock frequency of the platforms in both studies are
in the same range (the Dell laptop had a 266-MHz Pentium II CPU [40] whereas
the Nokia 770 is powered by a 220-MHz ARM processor [54]). Obviously, there are
other potentially influential factors that, in fact, have been different in the exper-
iments (e.g., Linux kernel version, network connection and the amount of RAM).
Nevertheless, the results by Henderson et al. are comparable to ours in terms of the
total duration of a HIP base exchange for a lightweight initiator and the impact of
the puzzle difficulty on the average processing time. While a HIP handshake on the
Dell laptop takes 0.95 seconds, the Nokia 770 performs a BEX in 1.40 seconds on
the average. Both studies show an exponential growth of the puzzle processing time,
which increases dramatically with the puzzle difficulty set over 15 bits. A three-way
HIP mobility update takes on the average on the Dell laptop 180 ms and on the
Nokia tablet 287 ms. While comparing the total duration of a HIP handshake or a
HIP mobility update it is important to know what the Round-Trip Time (RTT) in
both experiments accounts for. Unfortunately, Henderson et al. do not provide such
information, only indicating that the communicating Dell laptops were connected
over 10Base-T Ethernet. In turn, in our experiments an average RTT was equal to
2.8 ms, accounting for a negligible part of the handshake duration. Both studies
indicate that a large part of the BEX and update time is spent on the cryptographic
operations such as signing and verification procedures [40, 54].
Another study by Nikander et al. [82] proposes a HIP-based cumulative way to
address security, mobility and multihoming in the current Internet. Besides an
extensive description of the architecture and its components, the authors present
early implementation status and initial results of performing a HIP four-way ex-
change on two 800-MHz Pentium III machines running NetBSD 1.6 and connected
via a 100-Mbps Ethernet. Interestingly, the processing time that includes solving a
cryptographic puzzle greatly varies in the experiments even when puzzle difficulty
K is under 10 bits (from 300 to 2300 ms). The authors explain such deviation
by an indeterministic character of puzzle solving operation, which requires a larger
number of measurement repetitions to get more actual and precise results. Varying
time needed to solve a puzzle subsequently makes an impact on total duration of
a HIP association establishment, which ranges from 600 ms to 3 seconds with K
equal to zero and 10 respectively. Further increasing K raises processing time by
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a large factor, approaching 100 seconds when K amounts 15 [82]. This exponen-
tial growth goes very well with theoretical expectations, the results presented by
Henderson et al. [40] and our own results illustrated in Section 6.3.2. However, in
our measurements on a Nokia 770, an embedded Linux PDA, a boundary, which
determines a rapid increase of the puzzle processing time, is K = 15. Even with this
value of the puzzle difficulty, the Nokia 770 spends only 1.5 seconds on the average
on the respective base exchange phase, which is highly contrasting with the above
value of 100 seconds observed by Nikander et al. [82]. One potential reason for dif-
ferent results might be differences in the HIP implementations, operating systems
and underlying hardware platforms.
Pa¨a¨kko¨nen et al. in a recent study [87] present detailed measurement results of the
HIP-based handovers performed between different access networks and IP address
families. In addition, the authors consider various triggers to deliver event infor-
mation between the layers of the protocol stack, such as changes in IP addresses,
routing tables, and on the link layer. In the evaluation, triggering is thus integrated
with mobility in a testbed that includes a mobile node, a mobile router, a mobile
phone and a correspondent node that are all connected via versatile accesses (LAN,
WLAN, 3G and Bluetooth). The underlying test platform is FreeBSD that runs HIP
(here HIP4BSD software). The contribution of the study is an extensive evaluation
of the impact made by individual components, which constitute to the overall trig-
gering and handoff latency performed with varying access networks and IP protocol
versions. For instance, the delivery time of a mobility trigger from the IP to the
HIP layer ranges from 49 to 226 ms. HIP handover delays vary from 0.5 to 2.9 sec-
onds for the LAN→WLAN switching and from 1.5 to 2.5 seconds for the LAN→3G
handoff. According to the authors’ observation, Duplicate Address Detection and
Router Discovery increase the handoff latency in case of IPv6 autoconfiguration.
Interestingly, processing of a HIP ACK message involving updates to SAs (Security
Associations) and SP (Security Policies) on the correspondent node might occupy
up to 55% of the total handover duration. With 3G, the major impact is made by
the link latency [87].
3.4 Security and mobility issues in wireless networks
In this section we describe selected works in the field of security and mobility in
wireless networks that are relevant to our authentication architecture presented in
details in Chapter 8. Our original work [61] has much in common with research
problems described in this thesis in a way that it addresses security and mobility
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issues in wireless LANs by exploiting many of the HIP properties. However, cryp-
tographic operations involved with HIP might negatively affect performance of the
whole architecture if it consists primarily of the lightweight components. Not all
models of the Wi-Fi access routers, for instance, are equipped with sufficient hard-
ware resources to be part of such an architecture. Section 8.4 focuses on this issue
and provides interesting details. Below we refer to several related research areas.
An architecture for secure and mobile Wi-Fi sharing is proposed by Heer et al. [35,
37]. PISA (P2PWi-Fi Internet Sharing Architecture) eliminates well-known security
risks and attacks in open wireless networks. It also provides a solution for client
authentication and mobility, which is similar to our proposal described in Chapter 8.
On the other hand, PISA focuses on serving a slightly different role in the Internet,
namely implementing secure access control for global Wi-Fi sharing communities.
Similar work [23] considers distributed authentication, authorization and accounting
(AAA) in community Wi-Fi networks. It concentrates on building trust chains
between communicating entities using certificates and certificate authorities (CA).
Later valid certificates serve for authenticating the clients, as well as for identifying
and validating the decentralized AAA servers.
The concept of a distributed firewall used in our approach is not novel but existed
for a long time. Studies [43, 98] discuss the advantages of a distributed firewall
over a conventional centralized firewall in changing network topologies. The papers
describe key points in implementing a distributed firewall, including a mechanism
to enforce network security policy through a policy language. Additionally, a dis-
tribution scheme and an authentication technique for network entities participating
in the policy enforcement process are presented.
Source address validation is another topic related to our work. Source address vali-
dation architecture (SAVA) [103, 104, 105] addresses the problem of source address
spoofing on different levels of granularity, from a local subnetwork to autonomous
systems.
4 Research Problem
In this chapter we articulate the research problem that motivated us for this work.
We discuss three different perspectives of the problem: security, mobility and energy
consumption.
4.1 Security perspective
Although there have been several activities on adapting IP technology [19, 17] and
some related applications to embedded systems with severely constrained resources,
the security aspect of using the TCP/IP stack on lightweight devices is not suf-
ficiently explored. Among other researchers, Abeille´ et al. [5] note that further
studies are necessary to evaluate security mechanisms in the lightweight IPv6 stack
implementations dedicated to small objects. CPU, RAM and battery constraints
of lightweight mobile devices raise the concern whether IP security mechanisms
might be employed there without major modifications. In particular, asymmetric
cryptography algorithms implemented in software used to secure communications
between mobile resource-constrained devices can easily stress their CPU and mem-
ory resources, as well as negatively affect battery lifetime, TCP throughput and
Round-Trip Time.
We address this problem by measuring and evaluating performance of different IP
security components in the Host Identity Protocol. We analyse the impact made
by the heavyweight cryptographic operations on the constrained resources of mobile
devices, such as CPU load, RAM usage, and battery lifetime. We also assess the
impact made by the limited processor power and memory constraints on the dura-
tion of certain protocol parts including HIP base exchange, HIP mobility update,
puzzle solving procedure, and generation of a public-private key pair. In addition,
we evaluate the effect of IPsec ESP encryption on packet latency and TCP through-
put. This allows us to make recommendations on suitability of unmodified HIP for
lightweight class of mobile clients.
4.2 Mobility perspective
Mobility of a device denotes its freedom from a fixed network attachment point.
Thus, efficient and reliable mobility solutions are necessary for this class of devices.
If mobility does not work properly, the device loses its notion of being mobile. You
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can still carry it wherever you go, however, most likely, you will not be able to
utilize its full potential and keep your Internet sessions ongoing due to the limited
network coverage or changes of the network attachment point. On the other hand,
for a mobile client connected to the Internet wirelessly, i.e. via a cellular network or
a WLAN, the threat of attacks and the probability to be compromised are raising
compared to the wired networks. Hence, mobility needs to be secure.
Numerous solutions proposed in the literature range from network and application-
layer mobility to multilayered approaches [40, 82, 48, 49, 64, 95, 39]. However,
little knowledge is available on how well these solutions scale to the nature of the
embedded platforms that have distinct requirements from the desktop computers
and often behave differently. A mobile phone changes its network attachment point
more frequently than, e.g., a laptop or a PC. In addition, limited resources of an
embedded platform underlying a mobile phone may produce a need to adjust or
tailor existing solutions to achieve better performance.
Our objective with respect to mobility in this work is to identify potential issues
of running the IP-based secure mobility and multihoming protocols on lightweight
clients with constrained resources. Based on our experiments, we show that a HIP
mobility update lasts on a Nokia 770 Internet Tablet almost three times longer on
the average than on a laptop with similar RTT for both clients. Long duration of a
network-layer update procedure on small mobile devices might produce implications
for upper-layer applications. For some applications, there are strict timeouts and
requirements for the duration of an update procedure to be able to sustain an
IP address change. This motivates us to look at performance issues of secure IP
mobility.
4.3 Energy perspective
Power consumption is another critical issue for a mobile, battery-powered device. A
concept of accumulating power from a small battery rather than from a fixed power
outlet allows devices to be wearable, which partly constitutes the notion of mobility.
The challenges, however, arise from limited battery capacity that often prevents the
applications, especially involving wireless data transmission, from being active for
a long time. If an appliance needs to be recharged often, one can hardly call it
mobile as it requires frequent periodical wired connection to an electricity supply.
Coping with battery constraints on lightweight mobile handhelds is not an easy task
from the engineering perspective. Constantly increasing battery capacity cannot be
a long-term solution to the problem as it produces more heating to a mobile device
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making it less comfortable to use.
The use of wireless connection by a mobile device and computationally expensive
cryptography operations increase energy consumption and shorten battery depletion
time. One of our objectives in this thesis is to evaluate the impact made by the
IP security and mobility mechanisms on power consumption and battery lifetime
of a lightweight mobile device. In our experimentations, we measure the power
consumption of the Host Identity Protocol, which provides secure mobility by means
of public-key cryptography and IPsec ESP encryption.
5 Methodology
In this chapter we present the methodology for our work. First, we state the main
research methods. Next, we describe the primary research tools used in our experi-
mentations. Finally, we define the core assumptions in our work and limitations of
the research prototypes.
5.1 Research methods
The primary research methods used in this work have been literature study and
measurements performed in a real test network. Through the literature study we
obtained the insights into the research problem, evaluated the contribution of the
related work in the same field, and gained necessary background knowledge. The
survey of the related studies allowed us to draw some parallels with our own em-
pirical performance results. The empirical results were conducted in a number of
experimentations involving several mobile clients communicating with other hosts
and between each other in a variety of scenarios. We measured a set of different
parameters related to the Host Identity Protocol and two general network charac-
teristics. To get statistically more accurate results we repeated each measurement
a number of times. We then analysed the results from different perspectives and
made conclusions about feasibility of using unmodified HIP and IPsec on lightweight
mobile clients.
5.2 Research tools
This section presents a set of the tools that we have been using to accomplish
empirical part of our research. We start with a description of the development
environment that allowed us to port HIP to Maemo and Symbian mobile platforms.
We then introduce our test network and its components followed by a list of the
measurement tools.
5.2.1 Development environment
In the development phase, we ported an existing HIP software to two types of mo-
bile platforms, Linux Maemo and Symbian S60. For Maemo, we took the existing
HIPL (HIP for Linux) protocol implementation and compiled it for the Nokia 770
30
31
Internet Tablet using the Scratchbox cross-compilation toolkit and a Maemo SDK.
Further details on this process can be found in Section 6.1. For Symbian, the port-
ing procedure has been far more difficult due to the restrictions of public Symbian
SDKs and the platform-dependent HIPL code. Before we were able to run the pro-
tocol and measure its actual performance on a Symbian smartphone we needed to
go through a number of steps that are described in details in Section 7.1. As the de-
velopment environment we used an S60 3rd Edition Platform SDK for Symbian OS,
the Carbide.c++ IDE and the Open C SDK plug-in for S60 3rd Edition SDK. An
important role in the whole porting process to Symbian was given to the Symbian
S60 Emulator supplied with the SDK. With the emulator, we were able to debug
runtime code errors with less effort and test the main protocol operations before
measuring their performance on the actual mobile phones, Nokia E51 and N80.
5.2.2 Experiment setup
Measurements have been an essential part of our experiments to conduct empirical
results about performance of public-key operations and IPsec ESP encryption on
different mobile platforms. For the measurements we constructed a test network
consisting of a wireless access router IEEE 802.11 b/g connected with a server via a
network switch. Mobile clients such as a Nokia 770 Internet Tablet, an IBM laptop
and a Symbian-based Nokia E51 smartphone were connected to the network via
their wireless interfaces. The general network view is presented in Figure 5.1.
5.2.3 Measurement tools
To measure different protocol and network performance metrics we used a number of
tools and utilities, including iperf, ping, tcpdump, ping6 and Wireshark (Ethereal).
With iperf we measured the TCP throughput, with ping and ping6 we measured
the RTT and triggered the HIP base exchange. We used tcpdump and Wireshark
network analyser to capture traffic, analyse individual data packets and record their
arrival and departure times to calculate the duration of particular operations. In
addition, we created a set of shell scripts to automate measurement process and ease
repetition of the measurements. To analyse hardware resource utilization during
the protocol operations we used Nokia Energy Profiler with the Nokia E51 phone.
With the Nokia 770, we originally used an external multimeter to measure current
consumption of different applications running on the Internet tablet by connecting
its battery pins with the multimeter probes. With the OpenHIP implementation, we
used time stamps in the code to measure the delays of certain protocol operations.
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Figure 5.1: General view of the network setup.
5.3 Limitations and assumptions
When measuring duration of a HIP mobility update we “artificially” triggered mo-
bility by removing the current IP address of the Nokia 770 and adding a new IP
address manually. In this way we emulated a horizontal handover. Our assump-
tion was that regardless of the way, in which the IP address changes, HIP notices
such a change and initiates a three-way HIP mobility handshake. By the handshake
duration we mean the time needed for a mobile device to exchange three mobility
update packets with its peer before the data transmission continues.
As will be in details illustrated in Section 7.1.5, our Symbian HIP ports have several
limitations. First, we implement only the base operations of HIP including the HIP
base exchange and the security association establishment. Second, data encryption
by the IPsec ESP protocol is not realized due to the limitations of the public Sym-
bian SDKs and the complexity of implementing a substitute to the Linux TUN/TAP
device driver on Symbian. Finally, our Symbian ports can be run only on a limited
number of the end user smartphones. Symbian platform security concept neces-
sitates signing of each application package against a specific phone’s IMEI before
the package can be installed on the device. This makes debugging on the target
hardware inconvenient, requiring numerous rebuilding and resigning steps, and, at
the same time, complicates the large-scale deployment of the software.
6 Performance of Host Identity Protocol on Nokia
Internet Tablets
In this chapter, we report our experience with running the Host Identity Proto-
col on a Linux-based Nokia Internet Tablet. The chapter is based on our article
Performance of Host Identity Protocol on Lightweight Hardware7 [54]. Section 6.1
briefly describes the Nokia 770 Internet Tablet hardware and software, as well as
our port of the HIPL implementation. In Section 6.2 we present the components
of our experimental testbed. Section 6.3 contains measurement results of HIP over
WLAN with a Nokia 770 tablet in a set of scenarios. In particular, we measure the
duration of a HIP base exchange, a HIP mobility update, the data throughput and
the latency of a wireless network, as well as the impact of the protocol operations on
power consumption of a Nokia 770. We analyse each type of the measurements and
conclude about potential HIP implications for similar mobile devices with restricted
resources. Finally, Section 6.4 summarizes our performance evaluation on Nokia 770
with a list of recommendations.
Our choice of Nokia 770 Internet Tablet as a target device for experimentation had
been supported by several factors. First of all, it is a resource-constrained PDA
that provides a good example of lightweight hardware for assessing performance of
IP security and mobility. Second of all, such a handheld ideally represents a mobile
client constantly moving across the Internet and changing its network attachment
point. In this approach, the tablet would be a desired target to test a mobility
protocol, e.g., the mobility extensions of HIPL. Next, at the time of the experimen-
tation, Nokia 770 was gaining its popularity among both end-users and developers,
which resulted in a number of multimedia applications that might potentially utilize
the benefits of HIP. Finally, the embedded Linux OS running on Nokia 770 made it
easier to port the existing HIPL software from desktop to mobile platform.
6.1 HIP on the Nokia Internet Tablet
This section outlines the Nokia 770 technical specifications, as well as describes the
porting process of the HIPL implementation.
The Nokia 770 Internet Tablet is a Linux-based handheld with a high-resolution
touch screen display, built-in WLAN and Bluetooth support. Mainly designed for
7 c© 2007 ACM. Used with permission.
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easy Web browsing, the tablet is also convenient for Internet telephony and instant
messaging, reading emails and documents, and delivering media content. In its core,
Nokia 770 has a Texas Instruments (TI) OMAP 1710 CPU running at 220 MHz. The
device comes with a 64 MB DDR RAM and is powered by a 1500-mAh Li-Polymer
battery. The operating system is a modified version of Debian/GNU Linux. For
our experiments, we used a release version known as the Internet Tablet OS 2006
edition. It has a GNOME-based graphical user interface and runs a 2.6.16 series
Linux kernel.
Porting HIP to the Nokia 770 Internet Tablet consisted of two main stages, con-
figuring and compiling the Linux kernel, and building the protocol software for the
Nokia 770. Since the handheld is running an embedded Linux, we used an existing
Linux implementation of the protocol, HIP for Linux (HIPL), developed at Helsinki
Institute for Information Technology. Although the HIP daemon and other utility
programs of HIPL are the userspace applications, several modifications to the Linux
kernel were necessary to support HIP at the time of the experiment. In particular,
we had to apply an IPsec BEET patch, configure support of the IPv6, IPsec, AES,
3DES, and SHA1 algorithms and recompile the kernel for the ARM platform. To
build the HIPL userspace applications and the Nokia 770 Linux kernel we used a
cross-compilation environment Scratchbox that emulates the ARM environment on
a PC and allows compiling the applications, which later can be installed on a real
device.
6.2 Test environment
We performed our measurements on a Nokia 770 Internet Tablet (from now on - the
Tablet) and an Intel Pentium 4 CPU 3.00 GHz machine with 1 GB of RAM (the
PC) connected to each other via a switch and a WLAN AR in our test network (see
Figure 6.1). The network provided both IPv4 and IPv6 addresses. The wireless AR
supported IEEE 802.11g standard and WPA (Wi-Fi Protected Access) encryption.
All communicating parties used the same implementation of HIPL. To better in-
dicate the Tablet’s performance level we repeated our measurement scenarios with
a more powerful, 1.6 GHz IBM laptop (the Laptop) connected to the PC over the
same wireless link as the Tablet. Through comparison we evaluated the impact
of the Tablet’s lightweight hardware on the maximum achievable data throughput,
latency, duration of the base exchange and mobility update operations.
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Figure 6.1: Test network with Nokia 770.
6.3 Experiment results on Nokia 770
This section presents the results of our experiments with the Host Identity Protocol
on the Nokia 770 Internet Tablet. First, we introduce the platforms and the network
environment we used. Then, in the following subsections we report the measurement
results and their interpretation.
6.3.1 Duration of a HIP base exchange
A HIP association is set up by exchanging four control packets between communicat-
ing hosts. The purpose of measuring the HIP base exchange time was to determine
the duration of various BEX stages such as generating and processing the HIP con-
trol messages by the Tablet in comparison with the Laptop. The measurement was
performed using a script that established a HIP association 50 times in a number of
scenarios, which were distinctive from each other by the participating mobile device
(Tablet or Laptop), by the IP address family (IPv4 or IPv6) and by the algorithm
used (RSA or DSA). Since we did not find significant differences between IPv4 and
IPv6 performance we present only the results with the RSA HITs mapped to the
IPv6 addresses of the hosts.
Figure 6.2 depicts the times that were measured in our experiments. We leave
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Figure 6.2: Time spans measured on the Initiator and the Responder.
out I1 packet generation time due to its insignificance (the parameters of the I1
packet only include Initiator’s and Responder’s HITs, which are not signed). T1
represents the time for the Responder to process an I1 packet and generate an R1.
According to the HIPL implementation, Responder does not spend much time for
this phase since it chooses pre-created and signed R1 messages and adds a puzzle
to them just before sending the packet to a network. The next time, T2, contains a
number of CPU-intensive cryptographic operations such as generating and verifying
signatures, calculating a Diffie-Hellman (DH) session key. During this stage the
Initiator must also solve the challenge it received from the Responder. T3 indicates
the time needed by the Responder to process an I2 packet that involves the puzzle
solution check, Initiator’s public key verification and computation of the DH session
key. If the puzzle was solved correctly, Responder generates an R2 message and
signs it. Finally, during T4 the Initiator processes the R2 packet and completes the
BEX. At this point, the HIP association is established.
Figure 6.3 illustrates T1, T2, T3 and T4 times as well as the total duration of the
HIP base exchange. We compare the results for two different HIP associations where
the Initiators are Tablet and Laptop with the PC acting as the Responder. Thus,
T1 and T3 times are measured for the PC whereas T2 and T4 times correspond to
both Tablet and Laptop. As the figure indicates, the Laptop greatly outperforms
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Figure 6.3: Duration of HIP base exchange stages for Tablet and Laptop.
the Tablet for all operations involved with BEX. T2 time for the Tablet is nearly 1.2
seconds which is significantly longer than the respective one of the Laptop (0.14 sec-
onds). The majority of T2 is spent by the Tablet on the operations with the public
key signatures and generation of the Diffie-Hellman session key. This processing
time heavily depends on the length of a public key and the DH Group ID. For our
base tests on Tablet and Laptop we used the RSA key size of 1024 bits and 1536-bit
DH Group.
The next test established a HIP association initiated by the PC while the Tablet
acted as the Responder. The results suggest that the base exchange time is inde-
pendent of whether the PC or the Tablet initiates the handshake. In both cases,
having the precreated R1 packets, the base exchange lasts around 1.4 seconds.
Although 1.4 seconds to perform a HIP handshake between the Tablet and the cor-
respondent PC might be acceptable for users and applications, HIP communication
of two lightweight devices produces a higher delay. The BEX duration for a Tablet-
to-Tablet scenario is over 2.6 seconds. The Tablet spends a similar period of time in
T2 and T3 phases. The amount of work by the Tablet-Initiator during the phase T2
is analogous to that performed by the Tablet-Responder during the phase T3. The
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Figure 6.4: T2 processing time versus puzzle difficulty.
only difference is that in T2 the Initiator spends the time for solving a cryptographic
challenge whereas in T3 the Responder is supposed to verify the solution to that
challenge and also validate the Initiator’s HMAC signature. Otherwise, the same
operations on public key signatures and Diffie-Hellman keys are carried out by both
parties. Later, in the next section we will show that solving a puzzle with difficulty
of ten makes a minimal impact on the T2 processing time. Considering this fact
and also that puzzle solution check and HMAC validation in T3 are not computa-
tionally expensive we believe that the major influence on the BEX parts and the
total BE time is exerted by cryptographic operations costly for Tablet’s CPU. Such
operations include signatures verification and generation, as well as computation of
the Diffie-Hellman session key.
6.3.2 Puzzle difficulty
Upon receiving an R1 packet, the Initiator is expected to solve a cookie challenge
(puzzle) it gets from the Responder. This is done to protect the Responder against
possible Denial-of-Service attacks by compelling the Initiator to spend a certain
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Table 6.1: Median and average T2 with standard deviations for varying puzzle
difficulty.
T2 Median/Average±Stdev (sec)
K (bits) → 5 10 15 20
Tablet 1.03/1.03±0.03 1.19/1.19±0.02 1.33/1.41±0.28 9.06/12.21±9.72
Laptop 0.13/0.14±0.03 0.13/0.14±0.03 0.16/0.18±0.04 0.83/1.20±1.01
amount of CPU cycles to find a right answer. Depending on the conditions, i.e.,
on the trust level between the communicating endpoints, the Responder has an
opportunity to adjust the puzzle difficulty to be solved by the Initiator [72]. The
difficulty (K) is represented by a number of bits that must match in a hash output
sent back to the Responder. In the presented scenarios the default puzzle difficulty
of ten was used. To see how the duration of the base exchange is affected by the
puzzle difficulty we measured the time T2 with varying value of K.
Figure 6.4 illustrates this dependency for the Tablet and the Laptop and shows
that the time needed to solve the puzzle grows exponentially with increasing its
difficulty. The graph depicts the average T2 processing time for the puzzle difficulty
ranging from 0 to 25. The number of runs in each experiment was 30. In Table 6.1
we present the mean values and the standard deviation of the T2 processing time
that includes the time needed to solve a puzzle by the Tablet and the Laptop.
The tabulated results show a substantial increase of the standard deviation with
the growing puzzle difficulty. As was noted by Nikander et al. [82] in their study of
HIP, the reason likely comes from the indeterministic character of the puzzle solving
procedure, measuring which requires a larger amount of runs.
An interesting point that we observed in our experiment is that the processing time
starts rising dramatically when the puzzle difficulty is set to 15. Prior to this value
the effect of increasing the difficulty level is tiny. There is a little difference between
the processing times measured for the K values of zero and ten as compared to
the T2 value itself of approximately 1 second. This consequently means a minor
influence of the puzzle solving time to the total BEX duration in our measurements
with the puzzle difficulty of ten.
There is a time limit during which the Initiator must find a solution to the challenge.
With Nokia 770, setting a high value of K by the Responder would not be possible
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since the Tablet’s CPU will spend a long time to solve such puzzle. For example, a
puzzle difficulty of 20 would keep the Tablet’s CPU busy for over 10 seconds which is
unacceptable for most applications. The Laptop, in contrast, would solve a similar
challenge in 1.3 seconds on the average. Balancing between the puzzle difficulty and
the time limit during which a correct solution is valid for the Responder might be
an issue when using the lightweight hardware in a hostile environment with a low
level of trust.
6.3.3 Diffie-Hellman
The Diffie-Hellman (DH) key exchange protocol is used in HIP to exchange the pub-
lic keys of the hosts and produce a session key for the Initiator and the Responder.
A piece of keying material is then generated from the session key and is used to
create the corresponding HIP associations by the communicating parties [72]. The
Responder includes in the R1 packet one or two its public DH keys. Upon receiving
the R1 message with two DH values, the Initiator is supposed to select one that
corresponds to the strongest DH Group ID it supports. Using different DH Groups
makes it possible to affect the generation time of the DH session key and as a result
the total duration of the HIP base exchange. In reality, this means an opportunity
for a server to offer smaller DH public values to lightweight clients that are not
powerful enough or if the security is not of critical importance.
We measured the T2 processing time containing the generation of the DH session
key by the Initiator-Tablet and the Initiator-Laptop. The average T2 times for
the different DH groups are plotted in Figure 6.5. The graph shows an exponential
growth in the processing time as the DH group ID increases. When using the weakest
384-bit DH Group, the Tablet is able to complete the T2 phase in less than 130 ms
on the average. This reduces the four-way base exchange to some 200-300 ms with
the PC as the Responder. With the 768-bit DH Group, T2 processing time for the
Tablet is slightly higher and amounts to 234 ms, resulting in 340 ms on the average
for the total duration of the HIP BEX with the PC. However, switching to the
1536-bit DH Group for better security, produces a longer delay close to 1 second
on the average. Further increasing the DH modulus length to 3072 and 6144 bits
(which might be required under attacks) is not feasible for the Tablet as it results in
the tremendous delays for the applications (over 5 and 35 seconds correspondingly).
In comparison with the Tablet, the Laptop is capable of handling the stronger
encryption and spends less than 0.66 seconds on the average to compute the session
key with the 3072-bit DH Group.
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Figure 6.5: T2 processing time with different DH groups.
Our Diffie-Hellman measurements were conducted with a HIPL code snapshot as of
May 2007 running on the latest version of the operating system on the Tablet. The
DH experiment was also performed in a test network different from the one used for
the rest of our HIP measurements. We see these factors as a reason for a difference
of the results in the processing time of the HIP control packets on the Tablet (see,
for example, Figure 6.4 and Figure 6.5).
6.3.4 Round Trip Time
The RTT (Round Trip Time) equals the time for a packet to travel from a node
across a network to another node and back. Our tests evaluate the effect of HIP
and, in particular the IPsec BEET mode, on RTT. The tests used the ping6 tool for
sending the ICMP messages over HIP (messages encapsulated with ESP) and over
plain IP. We measured RTT in several scenarios including the Tablet, the Laptop
and the PC acting as the HIP hosts. The number of runs in each test was 100.
Table 6.2 contains the median values of RTT measured over plain IPv6 and over
HIP. We calculated the median values instead of the mean values and the standard
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Table 6.2: Median and average RTT with standard deviations for Tablet and Laptop.
RTT Median/Average±Stdev (ms)
IPv6 (64B) IPv6 (116B) IPv6/HIP
PC→Tablet 2.08/2.22±0.47 2.25/2.36±0.42 2.75/2.94±0.93
Tablet→PC 1.80/1.90±0.33 1.80/1.90±1.24 2.50/2.75±1.35
PC→Laptop 0.95/1.03±0.34 0.99/1.05±0.31 1.08/1.18±0.24
Laptop→PC 0.96/1.07±0.34 0.97/1.07±0.43 1.08/1.21±0.50
deviations because the RTT distributions in our experiments had several outliers.
The first outlier in each test was the first RTT value, which was large due to a
HIP base exchange and an ARP query performed upon the first connection. This
value was excluded from the distributions since our intention in this experiment
was to assess the impact of the IPsec encryption on the RTT. However, the RTT
distributions in some of the tests had other outliers not connected to the connection
establishment. For instance, the tests IPv6(116B) and the IPv6/HIP in the Tablet-
to-PC scenario contained one additional outlier caused by an unidentified reason.
To identify the exact reason for this outlier we would have had to repeat our tests at
least several hundreds times and look at the potentially influencing factors. With the
absent of the additional experiments, we decided to describe the whole distribution
to a reader with the cumulative distribution function (CDF) and show that the
frequency of the outliers in our 100-number distribution is rare. Figure 6.6 presents
the CDF for the RTT values in the Tablet-to-PC scenario using IPsec and illustrates,
for example, that the third quartile of this distribution equals to 2.60 ms and the
91.3% of the values do not exceed 3.00 ms.
The RTT time that we measured in the PC-to-Tablet scenario includes the
transmission time of an ICMP ECHO REQUEST message from the PC to the
Tablet, processing time on both hosts and the latency of delivering an ICMP
ECHO RESPONSE back to the PC. The default size of an ICMP message equals 64
bytes (56 data bytes and 8 bytes of the ICMP header). When used with the IPsec
BEET mode involved with HIP, the size of an ICMP message is augmented by the
ESP headers and amounts 116 bytes. We measured the RTT time for a plain ICMP
message of the size 64 bytes and 116 bytes, as well as for an ESP encapsulated ICMP
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Figure 6.6: CDF for the RTT in the Tablet-to-PC scenario with IPsec.
packet (IPv6 over HIP). The results indicate that increasing the size of the ICMP
packets merely does not affect the transmission latency. The major impact on the
RTT in our experiments was observed in the case with IPsec (2.75 ms) that slowed
down the packet processing on the Tablet by encapsulating the ICMP messages
with ESP. Comparing to a plain IPv6 message, the IPsec BEET mode increased
the median RTT value for the PC-to-Tablet connections by 0.67 ms. In contrast,
the same value for the PC-to-Laptop scenario is only 0.13 ms. According to this
comparison, the IPsec BEET mode involved with the Host Identity Protocol affects
more seriously the lightweight devices than the ordinary PCs or laptops.
6.3.5 Throughput
IPsec ESP data encryption performed by the Tablet can reduce the maximum
achievable throughput over the wireless link. We measured TCP throughput by
an iperf tool generating TCP packets to a correspondent node. It is necessary to
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Table 6.3: TCP throughput in different scenarios.
Throughput Mean ± Stdev (Mbps)
Tablet→PC Laptop→PC
TCP 4.86±0.28 21.77±0.23
TCP/HIP 3.27±0.08 21.16±0.18
TCP+WPA 4.84±0.05 –
TCP/HIP+WPA 3.14±0.03 –
mention that the WLAN AR introduces its own data encryption by means of the
WPA protocol. Different tests had been performed to evaluate the overhead of the
ESP and WPA data encryption. The average values of the throughput are pre-
sented in Table 6.3. An average value of 4.86 Mbps represents an upper bound of
the throughput achievable by the Tablet acted as the Initiator (see Tablet-to-PC
scenario). This value was measured with plain TCP/IP traffic in a totally open net-
work with no encryption algorithms employed. Although the Tablet’s specification
claims supporting IEEE 802.11b/g standard with a maximum data rate of 54 Mbps,
the Tablet’s CPU or possibly bad device driver implementation impose their own
constraints. Further analysing the results, we might conclude that the WPA encryp-
tion makes a minor impact on the throughput. Enabling the WPA access control
on the WLAN AR reduces the data rate only by 20 Kbps. In contrast, the ESP
influence is much stronger and reduces the throughput by 1.59 Mbps in the same
network. The mutual impact of WPA and ESP is larger as double encryption is
used.
In comparison with the Tablet, the Laptop achieves 21.77 Mbps of the TCP data
rate over the same open wireless link (see Laptop-to-PC scenario). An interesting
observation is that with the Laptop the impact of the ESP encryption involved with
HIP is small as compared to the Tablet and equals 0.61 Mbps of the throughput
decrease.
Figure 6.7 graphically depicts the results and shows the distribution of the TCP
and TCP/HIP throughput over a WPA-free wireless link. The graph illustrates the
influence of HIP on the TCP throughput as well as the difference in values achieved
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Figure 6.7: TCP throughput in an open wireless network.
by the lightweight Tablet and the much more powerful Laptop.
End-to-end security provided by HIP might be used not only for data protection
itself but also for authentication to an access router as an alternative to the WPA al-
gorithms in wireless networks. However, as the results above indicate for the devices
with limited computational power, the data throughput and latency are notably af-
fected by the ESP encryption in contrast to WPA encryption. In the absence of
hardware-accelerated cryptography or in the case of its improper implementation,
this might become a concern.
6.3.6 Duration of a mobility update
HIP sends mobility update packets when the IP address of a HIP mobile terminal
changes. We measured the time to exchange three mobility update packets by
manually changing the IP address of the Tablet’s network interface to trigger a
simple mobility event for HIP. We repeated our tests 35 times and calculated the
average value, which equalled 287 ms (see Figure 6.8). This time was necessary
to exchange three HIP mobility control packets between the Tablet and the PC
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Figure 6.8: Duration of a HIP mobility update.
and it also includes the RTT multiplied by 1.5. Comparing to the Tablet, the 1.6-
GHz Laptop was capable of completing the three-way mobility update with the
correspondent node in 100 ms on the average. One reason for a notable deviation
of the mobility update times visible on the graph can be the variation of the RTT
observed in the previous experiments.
However, in reality the detected delay for a mobility update can be lower for applica-
tions. Once the correspondent node receives the first UPDATE packet it knows the
Tablet’s new location and can transmit data to the new address using the Credit-
Based Authorization (CBA) mechanism. CBA limits the transmission rate to a new
IP address until it is verified to be reachable by the last two UPDATE packets.
Such practice prevents hijacking of arbitrary IP addresses. The average time for
generating, sending and processing the first UPDATE packet in our experiment was
around 20 ms.
47
Table 6.4: Power consumption by applications.
Application/Mode Current (A) Power (W)
HIP Base Exchange 0.36 1.33
ESP traffic (iperf with HIP) 0.38 1.41
Plain TCP (iperf without HIP) 0.38 1.41
Video stream from a server > 0.50 1.85
Local video 0.27 0.99
Audio stream from a server 0.40-0.50 1.48-1.85
Local audio 0.20 0.74
Browsing (active WLAN) 0.35-0.50 1.30-1.85
Passive WLAN 0.12 0.45
Idle mode 0.12-0.14 0.45-0.52
Standby mode < 0.01 0.04
6.3.7 Power consumption
Power consumption is a crucial issue for any portable device. The capacity of the
Nokia 770’s battery keeps the device in a standby mode for several days. However,
the battery resources are exhausted quickly by the applications requiring data trans-
mission over WLAN. The objective of measuring battery lifetime on the Tablet was
to assess how expensive the Host Identity Protocol operations might be in terms
of power consumption. We used an external multimeter to measure the consump-
tion of the battery’s current while the device was busy with various applications
(see Table 6.4). Given the capacity of the battery and the current consumed by
an application we were able to compute a theoretical time to deplete the battery.
Alternatively, we ran the same application on the Tablet with a fully charged bat-
tery until its depletion to verify our empirical assumption about the lifetime. With
HIP, the average current measured by the multimeter was 0.38 A. A fully charged
1500-mAh battery kept the Nokia Tablet working for about three and a half hours.
Our preliminary results show almost no difference in power consumption between
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the HIP-enabled and non-HIP applications. Establishing a HIP association, mobility
update as well as ESP encrypted traffic all consume a similar amount of the current
(0.36-0.38 A) equivalent to a plain TCP/IP data connection. We interpret these
results as caused by the low computational power of the Nokia’s CPU which tries to
utilize all available resources upon transmitting data over WLAN irrespective of the
protocol and the application being used. However, we note that ESP does consume
more power beside the non-ESP applications if compared to the data throughput. In
other words, due to a lower bit rate caused by ESP data encryption a HIP application
(using IPsec) would require a notably longer time for a similar task to be completed.
For instance, taking into account our throughput measurement results the Tablet
would be able to transmit 100 MB of data in 165 seconds over plain TCP/IP while
the same task performed using IPsec would spend additional 80 seconds (totalling
245 seconds). In terms of power consumption the use of HIP and the accompanying
IPsec would therefore intend a longer CPU utilization and consequently a larger
amount of consumed energy.
6.4 Summary of the results
This chapter presented measurements and performance evaluation of the Host Iden-
tity Protocol on the Nokia 770 Internet Tablet. We found several interesting results
on the use of asymmetric cryptography on lightweight Linux PDAs. The results are
summarized below.
• In such scenarios where the Nokia 770 communicates through a single proxy
server in the Internet, a HIP association establishment takes 1.4 seconds
on the average (including two RTT of 2.5 ms). A three-way mobility update
between the Nokia 770 and the proxy in this case lasts 287 ms on the average.
• For scenarios involving two mobile hosts or multiple parallel HIP associations,
the delay for the end user increases almost twice. For two Tablets, a HIP
association establishment takes 2.6 seconds on the average.
• For applications that do not require strong security (i.e., web surfing) the
duration of the HIP association establishment with a server might be reduced
by using a smaller DH modulus length. For instance, with the 768-bit DH
Group and the 1024-bit RSA key length the average total BEX can be as low
as 0.4 seconds (including two RTT of 2.5 ms).
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• Surprisingly, the Tablet only achieves the data rate 4.86 Mbps on the average
in a WLAN capable of 22 Mbps even without HIP. The use of the WPA
encryption has negligible effect on the throughput, but the ESP encryption
with HIP reduces the throughput to 3.27 Mbps on the average. It is still
sufficient for most Tablet’s applications.
• The RTT over WLAN is only several milliseconds in our experiments. The
ESP encryption increases the RTT by less than one millisecond that does not
noticeably affect the applications.
• The use of ESP encryption with HIP does not affect the instant current draw
in the Tablet, although the energy cost per byte is higher with ESP due to
reduced throughput. We noticed that the Tablet CPU is always fully utilized
when an application transmits data over WLAN that depletes the battery in
3-4 hours.
• We consider our measurement results to be potentially applicable to other
security and mobility protocols such as IKE [50] and MOBIKE [86], which
rely on similar public-key and IPsec ESP operations.
7 Performance of Host Identity Protocol on
Symbian OS
This chapter continues from Chapter 6 and reports on our experience with the Host
Identity Protocol on another operating system, Symbian OS, and another class of
devices, smartphones. While there are three open-source HIP implementations, little
experience is available with running HIP on lightweight hardware such as a cellular
phone. In this chapter we describe performance measurements of two different
HIP implementations ported to Symbian OS. In particular, we compare OpenHIP
and HIPL protocol implementations running on two Symbian S60 smartphones,
Nokia E51 and Nokia N80. The chapter is largely based on our article Performance
of Host Identity Protocol on Symbian OS 8 [53].
To check whether running IP-based security on smartphones is feasible, we per-
formed HIP measurements over WLAN with the Nokia E51 and Nokia N80 in dif-
ferent scenarios. Particularly, we measured the duration of a HIP base exchange
and its parts, as well as CPU load, RAM utilization and power consumption during
several phases of HIP daemon work. We found that, e.g., with 1024-bit keys, a HIP
base exchange with a server varies from 1.68 to 3.31 seconds depending on whether
the mobile phone is in standby or active state respectively. Extensive analysis of
HIP performance results allowed us to make conclusions and recommendations on
using unmodified HIP on lightweight cellular phones.
Symbian OS is one of the leading operating systems for smartphones. In Q2 2008,
19.6 million Symbian mobile phones have been shipped globally. The amount in-
creased by 5% from the same period of 2007 [4]. Smartphones in addition to tra-
ditional call and messaging functionality comprise a set of rich media applications
making them similar to PCs in functionality. However, performance and usability
of mobile applications are still a big concern. This is especially true with technolo-
gies initially designed to run on PCs. The contribution of this part of our work is
evaluation of applicability of existing IP security and mobility solutions for smart-
phones. In addition, by developing Symbian ports of two HIP implementations we
also contribute to the deployment of HIP. Our porting experience might be useful
for those planning to bring open source software to Symbian OS.
The rest of this chapter is structured as follows. Section 7.1 describes our ports of
HIPL and OpenHIP implementations. In Section 7.2 we present our experimental
8 c© 2009 IEEE. Used with permission.
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network testbed followed by description of scenarios and measurement tools in Sec-
tion 7.3. Section 7.4 contains selected measurement results of the base protocol and
their in-depth analysis. Section 7.5 concludes the chapter with a summary of key
findings and conclusions.
7.1 Main porting stages to Symbian
In this section we describe the key parts of the HIPL and OpenHIP porting pro-
cess and challenges that we faced while migrating to the Symbian platform. We
also present limitations of our prototypes. The porting process comprised several
stages such as choosing the development environment, examination of the existing
HIPL and OpenHIP source code, preparation of the Symbian project structure and
makefiles, compilation, debugging and testing.
7.1.1 Development environment
We started with no prior knowledge and experience of Symbian OS. To begin porting
process we needed to install an S60 3rd Edition Platform SDK for Symbian OS, a
Carbide.c++ IDE and an Open C SDK plug-in for S60 3rd Edition SDK. The
Open C plug-in brings support of nine standard POSIX and middleware C libraries
to Symbian OS and allows easier porting of the existing C applications to S60 3rd
Edition devices [27]. The availability of Open C plug-in played an essential role
in our project as it provided access to many standard C functions and allowed to
reuse the existing HIP implementations avoiding extensive modifications. Without
support of POSIX C libraries it would not be feasible to port the project written
in C without rewriting the major part of the code using the Symbian’s native C++
programming language.
7.1.2 Project preparation
Before actual porting it is necessary to study existing software, its features and
dependencies, and identify potential limitations of the target platform. To import
the HIPL and OpenHIP code to the Carbide IDE and start working on the project
we created a set of Symbian project files, bld.inf and mmp, which are platform and
compiler independent files in Symbian OS. To create these files we studied existing
Linux makefiles in the HIP projects. An mmp file contains all necessary information
needed to build a component or a project. Application type (e.g., dll, exe), source
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files, include directories, libraries, preprocessor macros, compiler and linker settings,
stack and heap size, program capabilities and many other options are specified in
the project definitions files mmp. A bld.inf file in turn comprises information about
project mmp files, exports, and build platforms (e.g., WINSCW, GCCE). Having
prepared the project files, one can build the project for different Symbian platforms
and compilers.
For OpenHIP we chose a set of source files needed to run HIP in userspace mode,
since we believed that this mode should be compatible with any platform that
supports standard POSIX C libraries. We also included implementation of security
association database (SADB) and PFKEY [68] protocol (with BEET mode support)
for communication with SADB.
7.1.3 Compilation
The most common cause for compilation errors in the code was implicit data type
conversions. Symbian compiler needs an explicit type casting to be performed.
Furthermore, the Symbian compiler does not allow declaration of data types in the
middle of a function. To avoid the compilation errors we had to add a number of
extra definitions to the Open C header file netinet6/in6.h for HIPL project.
OpenHIP architecture, in turn, was better suited for porting. In fact, we did not
change any system headers. Similarly with HIPL, we have been using preprocessor
logical statements to separate system-specific code parts, and in case of missing
functionality reimplemented it.
7.1.4 Debugging
When debugging the HIPL code we found a number of porting issues that arose only
during execution of the HIPL daemon. The errors were caused by a difference in
Linux and Symbian emulator compilers. The most interesting issues were detected in
data structures that contain an array of zero elements. The first error type concerned
the size of such structures. In Linux, a structure member declared as an array of
zero elements (e.g., uint8 t data[0]) does not increase the size of whole structure.
On the contrary, the size of the same structure in the Symbian emulator was bigger
due to the size of the ”null” array treated by the Symbian emulator compiler as one
byte.
The second error type was related to memory alignment. Upon referencing arrays
of zero elements in a structure, the program running on Linux and on Symbian
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emulator tried to access different memory blocks within that structure. Interestingly,
we found that the Symbian compiler always rises the total size of the structure
elements preceding a ”null” array to an even value by adding an extra memory byte.
As a result, to access a correct value recorded in the ”null” array we had to shift
the pointer appropriately. The piece of the code below illustrates this issue with a
particular example. Here, the size of the structure members group id and pub len
is 3 bytes, and Symbian compiler adds an additional 8 bits of memory prior to the
member public value.
struct hip dh public value {
uint8 t group id;
uint16 t pub len;
uint8 t public value[0];
} attribute ((packed));
It is worth mentioning that this specific feature has been detected only with the
mwcsym2 compiler that is used with the Symbian emulator. When the HIPL code
was built for the target hardware with the GCCE compiler, the program behaved
similarly as on Linux and all the changes we have made for the emulator needed
to be restored. We did not find an explanation of such a difference between the
compilers in the technical documentation.
7.1.5 Limitations of the prototypes
Both HIP implementations are entirely written in C and consist of a HIP userspace
daemon and several HIP libraries. As the HIPL project was originally developed for
Linux, the implementation contained several platform-dependent features such as
the NETLINK socket for kernel and userspace communication. To protect payload
data, HIPL uses the IPsec protocol that resides in Linux kernel. Due to limited
public Symbian SDK and restricted access to Symbian network stack, our HIP pro-
totypes for Symbian support only the base protocol part without ESP encapsulation
of data packets in the system kernel. However, with OpenHIP we ported a userspace
alternative – PFKEY protocol and SADB. As a result, we were able to successfully
encrypt/decrypt UDP encapsulated incoming ESP packets.
Open C plug-in itself has a set of limitations that required us to modify the existing
source code and disable a part of its functionality. Examples of unsupported or
restricted features in Open C are signals, fork() and exec(), wait() and waitpid()
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Table 7.1: Technical specifications of tested phone models.
Smartphone Models → E60 N80 E51
CPU Clock Rate, MHz 220 220 369
SDRAM / Free Exec RAM, MB 64/21 64/18 96/50
Battery Capacity, mAh 1020 860 1050
functions, multiple I/O consoles [26]. Because of Open C constraints our HIP
ports for Symbian use only UDP sockets to send HIP control packets excluding a
raw-socket alternative as in the original HIP software. In OpenHIP, we used UDP
encapsulation also for ESP packets, so that the raw socket limitation can be bypassed
for ESP as well. The architecture of OpenHIP allowed us to support almost full-
featured HIP implementation on Symbian OS. However, to run legacy applications
over HIP an equivalent of Linux TUN/TAP driver needs to be implemented.
The HIP code ported to Symbian OS requires NetworkService system capability,
which identifies a functionality for remote access to services that can produce cost
to the phone user, such as network usage. Both HIP implementations compiled for
the target hardware were signed with enabled NetworkService capability against a
specific phone International Mobile Equipment Identity (IMEI) number and, with-
out recompiling, cannot be used on any other S60 3rd edition mobile phone. To
install the HIP daemon on another phone one has to sign the package with its own
IMEI number at www.symbiansigned.com.
7.2 Our testbed
We have tested HIPL and OpenHIP code running on several Symbian phones:
Nokia E60, Nokia N80, and Nokia E51. The first two devices are based on
S60 3rd Edition platform and Symbian OS v9.1, whereas Nokia E51 is a slightly
newer and more powerful smartphone that runs Symbian OS v9.2 and uses
S60 3rd Edition Feature Pack 1 developer platform.
The general specifications of the tested phone models are summarized in Table 7.1.
Nokia E60 has equivalent to N80 hardware resources and shows similar performance.
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To obtain competitive results we measured HIP performance on a more powerful
Nokia E51 phone equipped with a 369-MHz ARM11 CPU and a notably bigger
RAM module of 96 MB. All phone models support IEEE 802.11 b/g connectivity
standards with WPA2 encryption and a number of cellular standards including
WCDMA, EGPRS, and HSCSD. Battery capacity in all phone models we used
varies from 860 to 1050 mAh.
We measured the performance of HIP over WLAN. Our experimental network con-
sisted of a D-Link DGL-4300 access router, three mobile phones, and an Intel(R)
Xeon(TM) server with a 3.2-GHz CPU and 2 GB of RAM. The server was placed
into the same network as cellular phones. The experimental testbed was similar to
the one presented in Figure 6.1 except that Nokia Internet Tablets were replaced
with Symbian smartphones.
7.3 Scenarios and tools
In basic scenarios, we established a HIP association between each of the Nokia
phones and the server. We evaluated each stage of the base protocol separately
including HIP daemon initialization, asymmetric key pair creation, daemon idle
time, and protocol handshake (HIP base exchange). In the thesis we mainly re-
port results obtained on Nokia E51 that showed better performance than two other
models. Where possible we refer to the respective performance metrics measured
on Nokia N80 and E60.
With Nokia E51, we utilized Nokia Energy Profiler, a convenient tool that runs on
the phone in background and allows monitoring hardware usage in real time, as well
as exporting data to a PC for future analysis. Profiling data includes information
about such parameters as power and memory consumption, and CPU load.
With Nokia E60 and N80, we used Carbide.c++ Performance Investigator to collect
and analyse data about usage of different resources. Performance Investigator con-
sist of a profiler that gathers profiling data to a file during application runtime, and
an analyser that runs on a PC and handles profiling data. Profiling data includes
information about processes, threads, binary load, memory and power consumption.
7.4 Performance evaluation
This section presents and analyses the results of our measurements with the Host
Identity Protocol on Symbian OS obtained with HIPL and OpenHIP prototypes.
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Table 7.2: Base exchange duration with HIPL and OpenHIP.
Nokia E51 Median/Average±Stdev (sec)
↓ Scenario/Implementation → HIPL OpenHIP
Phone→Server (Active) 3.21/3.17±0.11 3.05/3.09±0.17
Phone→Server (Standby) 1.66/1.68±0.06 1.93/1.90±0.12
Server→Phone (Active) 3.34/3.31±0.10 2.74/2.76±0.11
Server→Phone (Standby) 1.73/1.76±0.14 1.84/1.85±0.07
Phone→Phone (Active) 6.71/6.42±0.71 4.30/4.30±0.07
Phone→Phone (Standby) 3.83/3.78±0.13 3.49/3.50±0.12
7.4.1 HIP base exchange duration
In this section, we analyse HIP handshake duration in different scenarios. Surpris-
ingly, we found a significant difference in HIP base exchange performance measured
in active and standby phone states. We use terminology from [25] and slightly mod-
ify it. We call a phone state active when its display is switched on and refreshing
(with backlight either on or off). In turn, we call a phone state standby when its
display is in partial refresh (backlight is off; either date and time, text or animation
is shown).
As Table 7.2 indicates, the total average time for HIPL base exchange initiated from
the E51 phone to the server equals 3.17 seconds in the active phone state. Switching
the phone to the standby mode reduces HIP base exchange duration almost twice
(1.68 seconds). We believe the reason for such a great difference in performance
is that in the standby mode no graphics are drawn and display is not refreshing,
which releases extra CPU cycles that are utilized by the HIP daemon. On the other
hand, in the active phone state, the processor load is close to 100% due to constant
display refreshing, which prolongs processing time by the HIP daemon; we observed
such behaviour by activating and deactivating the phone screen with running Nokia
Energy Profiler.
The scenario with E51 as a HIP initiator is more natural for the Internet where most
of the connections are initiated from mobile clients to servers. In the opposite direc-
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tion (server → phone) duration of the HIPL handshake slightly rises and becomes
3.31 seconds in the active and 1.76 seconds in the standby state (see Table 7.2).
Thus, time variation of the HIP base exchange performed in two opposite directions
is insignificant. In our previous study [54] we obtained similar performance results
with merely equal HIP handshake duration measured in two directions between a
Nokia 770 Internet Tablet and a server. Further comparison to our previous work [54]
indicates that the HIP base exchange performance on Linux-based Nokia 770 In-
ternet Tablet is better than on Symbian-based Nokia E51 smartphone (1.40 versus
1.68 seconds), although the latter has more CPU and RAM resources. We explain
this phenomenon as an impact of the Open C plug-in that is used with our Symbian
HIP ports to wrap C function calls to native Symbian APIs.
Further analysis of the results in Table 7.2 indicates that the OpenHIP implemen-
tation shows slightly better performance than HIPL in the active phone state es-
tablishing a HIP association between the E51 and the server on the average during
3.09 seconds and in the opposite direction in 2.76 seconds. Though the effect of
standby state in OpenHIP case is less significant than with HIPL (OpenHIP 35%
against HIPL 47% time decrease when switching to standby mode).
A large part of the Internet traffic nowadays is generated by P2P applications.
Keeping that in mind we measured HIP implementation performance running on
two mobile phones. Our preliminary tests show (see Table 7.2) that two Nokia E51
smartphones in standby state are able to establish a HIPL association in 3.78 sec-
onds and an OpenHIP association in 3.50 seconds. Switching to the active mode
significantly increases the HIP handshake time for HIPL (6.42 seconds) while not
seriously affecting OpenHIP (4.30 seconds).
Although it is interesting to know the HIP base protocol performance level in the
standby phone state (i.e., when the HIP daemon is implemented as an engine and
runs in background) we have to rely on the results obtained in the active state.
This is because we expect user to interact with mobile phone (thus, activating the
display) while using applications that might benefit from HIP.
7.4.2 Asymmetric key pair creation
Table 7.3 includes the median duration of creating a public-private key pair of
different size on the Nokia E51. The results indicate an exponential growth of the
key pair generation time with increasing the key length. With the conventional
1024-bits keys, the median time to generate an asymmetric DSA key pair on E51 is
25.4 seconds. The generation of an equivalent RSA key pair is much faster with the
58
Table 7.3: Creation of a key pair of different size on the Nokia E51.
Median time (sec)
↓ Algorithm / Key (bits) → 512 1024 2048
DSA 4.9 25.4 232.1
RSA 0.52 3.7 27.1
median time 3.7 seconds. It is worth noting that the use of the keys with the length
over 1024 bits) would produce a delay of almost four minutes with DSA and half a
minute with RSA.
One might argue that keys are needed to be created only once, i.e., upon installing
HIP and this would not affect the overall phone performance in the long run. Never-
theless, we find stressing of a mobile phone even for a short period to be inconvenient
and slowing down the phone’s operations when its normal functionality is crucial
(as with emergency calls). According to our practical experience, the generation
and usage of lengthy keys on mobile phones with lower amount of RAM and CPU
power, such as E60 or N80, seriously affect the handset performance and can make
the phone completely unresponsive for several minutes.
Long generation time of a public-private key pair on the Nokia E51 illustrates the
necessity to look for different approaches for managing the keys on mobile phones.
One approach can be to generate the keys on a PC and securely transfer them to a
phone. This can be performed by the phone’s user assisted by an application either
supplied with the mobile phone or available elsewhere. Another approach can be to
precreate the keys for a mobile phone and transfer them to the device before it is
sold. In this case, any additional user actions are avoided. Further details on the
key distribution on mobile devices are left outside of this work.
7.4.3 CPU load
In this and the following subsections we report on the indicators of hardware uti-
lization that were collected with the Nokia Energy Profiler on the Nokia E51.
The CPU Load during the HIPL daemon initialization and asymmetric key pair
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Figure 7.1: HIPL daemon initialization. CPU load on E51.
creation on E51 is presented in Figure 7.1. Most of the 2-minute measurement period
the CPU load stays at 100% and this corresponds to the daemon initialization (up to
the 12th-second timestamp) and the generation of four different public-private key
pairs (the interval from 12th to the 104th second). The rest of the graph (from the
104th second onwards) has several peaks that account for precreation of the HIP R1
packets. In idle time the HIPL daemon does not consume much of processor power.
We also noticed that switching the phone to the active state significantly rises the
CPU load. The CPU utilization with the OpenHIP implementation is similar to the
HIPL case.
7.4.4 RAM usage
Although each mobile phone has certain amount of RAM memory, only a part of it
is available to applications. For example, on the Nokia E60 only 21 out of 64 MB
are available to the executables. The rest of the memory is reserved for the exclusive
use by the system. This reduces the number of the user applications that can be
simultaneously ran on the device. According to our profiler data, the memory usage
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Figure 7.2: OpenHIP daemon initialization with BEX. RAM usage on E51.
on the N80 phone stays on the level of 20 MB during the HIPL daemon initialization,
the key generation and the HIP handshake. Note that this value depicts the overall
memory use by all running applications. Assuming that other applications are in the
idle state, we can figure out the memory use by the HIP daemon. On the Nokia E51,
the memory use dynamics are almost the same as on N80. The only difference is
the amount of available RAM, which is larger on E51. According to the technical
specifications, E51 allocates to the applications approximately 50 MB out of the
total 96 MB of RAM.
Figure 7.2 depicts the RAM usage by the OpenHIP implementation on the
Nokia E51 during the daemon initialization and the BEX. The reader should take
into consideration the fact from the previous paragraph and notice that the graph
shows the overall memory consumption by all applications. In fact, HIP starts its
initialization at the point of approximately 36 MB. The time interval from the 8th
to the 50th second corresponds to the key creation and serialization. Since Open-
HIP stores all precreated keys in RAM (as well as serialized to the file system), the
memory use increases by 3 MB. However, later during the base exchange and the
idle time (the time interval from the 50th to the 80th second), the memory usage
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Figure 7.3: HIPL daemon initialization. Power consumption on E51.
does not grow drastically but only increases by half a MB during the processing of
the BEX packets (which is freed afterwards) and adding the SAs to the SADB. In
fact, the total RAM usage of 3 to 4 MB by the protocol is within the normal bounds
and should not stress the performance of a mobile phone. Hence, from the RAM
utilization prospective both HIPL and OpenHIP could be run on a Symbian mobile
device without major changes to its architecture.
7.4.5 Power consumption
Figure 7.3 illustrates the power consumed by the E51 phone with the running HIP
daemon during its initialization and idle time. The value of 0.62 Watt represents the
average consumed power over a 2-minutes measurement period. The peaks on the
graph between the 8th second and the 53nd second timestamps show the maximum
power consumption over the measurement period and they account for the creation
of two DSA and two RSA key pairs.
To compare how HIP affects the battery life of the phone we measured the average
power consumption while the phone was in ”normal” use (i.e., no HIP daemon was
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running) and with the HIP daemon doing the base exchange. As a result, we ob-
tained 222 mW/60 mA and 333 mW/90 mA on the average respectively, which after
the extrapolation corresponds to 18 and 12 hours of a 1050-mAh battery lifetime.
In reality, the constant exchange of the HIP control packets is abnormal behaviour
of the HIP daemon, so the purpose of these results is rather to illustrate an instant
power consumption by the cryptography operations constituting the BEX.
7.5 Summary of the results
This chapter presented measurements and performance evaluation of two separate
Host Identity Protocol implementations on Symbian OS. Below we summarize the
most interesting and important results that at the same time can serve as recommen-
dations on the use of public-key cryptography on lightweight Symbian OS mobile
phones.
• A single HIP base exchange between the Nokia E51 and a proxy server lasts
for 1.7-3.2 seconds on the average depending on the phone state (active or
standby).
• In turn, two Nokia E51 require 3.5-6.4 seconds on the average to establish a
HIP association.
• The public-private key pair generation might stress the phone and make it
unresponsive for up to four minutes, especially with the key length greater
than 1024 bits. However, this issue can be addressed by several alterna-
tive approaches such as predistributing the keys before the device is sold or
generating the keys on a PC and transferring them to the mobile phone.
• Key creation boosts the CPU utilization and consumes a notable amount of
power but otherwise the HIP daemon in the idle state consumes few resources.
The impact of the WLAN transmission on energy consumption has to be
considered separately.
• The OpenHIP implementation had been easier to port and showed slightly
better performance over HIPL.
• Better performance results could have been achieved if HIP was implemented
using the native Symbian C++ APIs rather than the Open C plug-in. This is
because Open C is a wrapper to the native Symbian APIs and, thus, produces
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an additional overhead comparing to the native applications. However, it
should be noted that this remark is rather based on common sense, and we
cannot provide any numbers illustrating the level of the potential performance
increase.
8 Security and Mobility in Wireless LANs
In the previous chapters we evaluated performance of the Host Identity Protocol
for two types of the resource-constrained mobile platforms (a Linux PDA and a
Symbian smartphone). In this chapter, we present a more general view on similar
problems of security and mobility, and expand our analysis and evaluation from
the end user devices towards an ecosystem, where communications of such devices
with other components of the infrastructure need to be secure. In particular, we
consider WLAN networks, which have recently become a common way to access the
Internet, and address the following issues: authentication and access control, host
mobility and multihoming, communication security and prevention of several types
of external attacks on the operator’s infrastructure.
In the following sections, we first highlight several essential bottlenecks of WLANs
and explain our motivation and then introduce our own distributed authentication
architecture intended to prevent wireless networks from unauthenticated access,
impersonation and network abuse, data interception and different types of attacks.
In addition, we evaluate performance of selected architectural components based on
the measurements in a test network. The chapter is mainly based on the article
Distributed User Authentication in Wireless LANs9 [61].
Our architecture utilizes several benefits of the Host Identity Protocol. It integrates
an operator-specific HIP proxy with a HIP-aware firewall running on each of the
operator’s WLAN access routers (ARs) so that the mobile clients can instantly gain
WLAN access and move freely within the operator’s network. To build our ar-
chitecture, we have implemented a port of the HIPL protocol implementation to
run on OpenWrt WLAN ARs. We analyse measurement results obtained on two
types of ARs with highly varying resources, La Fonera FON2100 and Gateworks
Avila GW2348-4. Performance evaluation suggests that a two-level approach con-
sisting of a single HIP proxy server and a distributed HIP firewall is appropriate,
given limited hardware resources of some WLAN ARs. The presented architecture
is planned to be deployed in panOULU [3], a public city WLAN in Finland.
The rest of this chapter is structured as follows. Section 8.1 discusses the issues with
existing wireless networks and states the objectives we aim to achieve with our ar-
chitecture. Section 8.2 presents our distributed WLAN authentication architecture.
In Section 8.3 we describe our port of the HIPL implementation to OpenWrt plat-
form and experimental testbed used for our measurements. Section 8.4 contains the
9 c© 2009 IEEE. Used with permission.
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measurement results of CPU and memory utilization on two different AR models.
Section 8.5 concludes the chapter.
8.1 Motivation
An increasing number of laptop and smartphone users utilize WLANs for Internet
access at work, home, and public places. Unfortunately, authentication mechanisms
in WLANs remain cumbersome, unreliable and disruptive to users. Typically, the
WLAN users are required to re-enter their login and password periodically through
a captive web page, or manually configure the WPA keys or 802.1X settings. The
owners of open WLANs risk to fall under police investigation in case of network
misuse.
Open wireless networks (such as presented in Figure 8.1) usually have no mecha-
nisms for access control, protection of data integrity and confidentiality. The core
of the problem is that anyone can gain access to the network without providing
and validating their identity. This allows an attacker to perform illegal actions and
potentially cause damage to the infrastructure without being caught. On the other
hand, publicly available WLANs usually use no encryption, hence all the traffic
transmitted over the air can be easily sniffed, analysed and used for malicious pur-
poses. To eliminate such risks, we need the mechanisms that would provide reliable
data protection and access control.
Several trends make the situation harder with time. Some emerging devices, such
as smart key chains, are being equipped with WLAN capability, although missing
a screen to display and enter login information. Furthermore, recent advances in
breaking WPA encryption 10 and 802.1X 11, necessitate to look for far robust IP-layer
encryption over the wireless link.
The above issues have been addressed in a number of research projects resulting in
several potential solutions (e.g., [58, 8]). However, none of the methods achieves all
of the following properties at the same time: 1) disruption-free user authentication
2) protection of operator’s infrastructure from external attacks 3) host mobility and
multihoming 4) IPsec encryption over the wireless link.
10Researchers Crack WPA Wi-Fi Encryption, http://it.slashdot.org/article.pl?sid=08/
11/06/1546245
11802.1X vulnerabilities, http://www.microsoft.com/technet/community/columns/
secmgmt/sm0805.mspx
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Figure 8.1: Open network access model.
8.2 Distributed authentication architecture
In this section we present our approach for automatic WLANs authentication ac-
cording to the design goals stated in the previous section. We start by describing
the main architectural components and principles, proceed with discussing the ap-
proaches for synchronization of the distributed firewalls, then highlight several ideas
on the rule management and finally mention a number of potential methods for
subscribing to the service.
8.2.1 Architectural components and principles
The general view of our architecture is shown in Figure 8.2. We propose to utilize
HIP as a backbone that supports client mobility and multihoming in addition to
WLAN authentication. A HIP-enabled mobile client establishes a secure association
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Figure 8.2: Distributed authentication model.
with a central HIP proxy installed on the default gateway in the core network. User
data is then protected by the ESP secure tunnel. HIP and IPsec associations are
updated when the client moves to another location within the network. Another
role of the central HIP proxy is to enable connections from the mobile HIP clients to
the remote servers in the Internet that do not understand HIP. In a simple scenario,
the HIP clients connect to the non-HIP Web servers through an HTTP/HIP proxy
to secure their browsing sessions.
To solve the authentication problem, we introduce a set of interconnected HIP-aware
firewalls called the distributed firewall (see Figure 8.2). The main purpose of a HIP-
aware firewall is to filter traffic based on a predefined list of allowed Host Identity
Tags (HITs) that authenticate clients to the operator. Additionally, the firewall can
perform a digital signature check (as, for instance, in PISA project [37]).
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Checking the signatures provides a higher authentication level but involves the cryp-
tographic operations. The overhead can negatively affect the overall data through-
put of the firewall and reduce the number of clients served with a reasonable QoS
level.
HIT-based filtering can be sufficient for a WLAN network when a client connects to
the Internet through the central HIP proxy. Even if an attacker is able to generate
a valid HIT, it would fail to complete the HIP base exchange after receiving an
R1 packet (due to lack of knowledge of a private key). After a HIP association
is established, ESP traffic is filtered using SPI values stored from the HIP base
exchange.
However, in a scenario where a mobile client communicates with another mobile
client in the same WLAN network, an attacker has chances to replay the HIP control
and the ESP packets (sent between two mobile hosts) and establish a communication
with another attacker within the same network, thus using the network resources
on behalf of the legitimate clients. To eliminate such risks we suggest to use an
extension for client authentication and authorization at the middleboxes proposed
by Heer et al. [36]. In our architecture, the Wi-Fi ARs would play the role of the
middleboxes that can authenticate the HIP and ESP packets transmitted between
two mobile clients in the same WLAN.
8.2.2 Synchronization of firewalls
Distributed HIP firewalls are placed on the edge of the wireless network and perform
packet filtering based on the predefined access control list (ACL). In other words,
traffic from a registered HIT can successfully pass through the firewall and flow
to the core network. In such an architecture, all participating Wi-Fi ARs (HIP-
aware firewalls) should maintain a fresh copy of the rules, so that a newly registered
customer can pass authentication successfully anywhere within the WLAN coverage.
Synchronization of the ACLs needs to be efficient. The lists should be updated
frequently without flooding the network with signaling traffic. In this paper we are
not proposing any specific protocol for synchronization but offer a general architec-
ture overview and suggest the following two approaches for synchronizing the ACLs
between the firewalls:
• First, a firewall can store the complete ACL locally and query the central
policy coordinator server on-demand (when no matching rule is found locally)
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Algorithm 1 ACL synchronization algorithm.
Require: certificate 6= NULL
Require: addressserver 6= NULL
if authenticate(certificate, addressserver) = TRUE then
updateACL(addressserver)
resetStatsForNewEntries()
sortACLbyStats()
else
reportError()
end if
or at fixed intervals (this approach will cause a higher network load). A
request will update the list of allowed HITs.
• Second, the AR firewalls can form a peer-to-peer network (for instance, using
a DHT). Each AR would store a partial list of allowed HITs and perform on-
demand queries to the overlay if the matching rule is not found locally.
For the first approach, we assume that a centralized policy coordinator is present
in the network (in Figure 8.2 it is placed on the gateway). Such policy coordinator
holds the current list of the allowed HITs (or a user registration database). A simple
ACL synchronization protocol is exemplified in Algorithm 1.
To synchronize the ACLs, an AR is required to authenticate itself to the central
server with a certificate, or using other available mechanisms. Upon successful
registration, the AR merges the ACL with the new updates.
8.2.3 Rule management
With linear search, the packet filtering time on a Wi-Fi AR firewall depends on
the position of the appropriate rule in the ACL. Classifying and matching a packet
takes Θ(n) time in the worst and O(1) in the best case, where n is the number of
the rules in the ACL. Our initial experimental results with packet filtering time on
Avila confirmed the need to employ a rule management technique to achieve better
filtering performance than that provided by pure linear search.
A simple strategy to sort the rules in the ACL may involve collecting per-packet
statistics and trying first the most frequent rules. An alternative solution can be
a hash table that guarantees O(1) search time. However, this will constrain the
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flexibility of the rules and restrict the search criteria to only one key, e.g., the source
HIT. Such approach might successfully work in a simple setup, but more flexible
systems would require a more comprehensive algorithm. The hash table approach
might be infeasible if the ACL controls the number of the remote servers the user
is allowed to access. In this case, each rule in the ACL needs to have a destination
HIT. However, a hash table cannot provide filtering based on multiple criteria. Yet
another approach for matching the rules is to use tries and ternary trees. For our
architecture, we do not specify any particular method for ordering and matching
the rules. In fact, this is a general topic, which has been extensively studied in the
literature [7, 30, 45, 99].
8.2.4 Service subscription
Prior to the first-time connection to an operator’s WLAN, a client in our architecture
is supposed to perform a registration or, in other words, to subscribe to the service.
The registration has to be done in a secure way, resulting in authenticating the client
to the operator and storing the mapping between the user identity and her HIT in
a registration database. The registration database is then synchronized among all
firewalls. In practice, there might be several alternative methods to accomplish this
procedure, including registration in person at an office by providing an identity card;
subscription to the service in the Internet using a banking authentication service;
registration by mobile phone or via email. Each mechanism has its own advantages
and disadvantages. More details on the different subscription methods can be found
in the literature. For instance, Kuptsov and Gurtov [60] describe a simple web and
email-based registration system. In general, the design of such systems needs to
have a good trade-off between the security and the convenience of usage.
8.2.5 Compatibility with legacy clients
A large-scale deployment of our architecture can require a transition phase, when not
all of the mobile clients will understand HIP. In this section, we consider two possible
approaches to provide backward compatibility to the legacy clients in the early
deployment stages. Both approaches require support of legacy and HIP-enabled
clients in the WLAN ARs.
In the first approach, we can run a HIP proxy on a WLAN AR. This proxy would
provide support for non-HIP (legacy) clients by translating the plain TCP/IP data
to the HIP and ESP traffic. In this case, the WLAN AR would need to perform the
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HIP base exchange and IPsec encryption (between the AR and the central network
gateway). Our measurement results in Section 8.4.2 indicate that this approach is
inefficient for a resource-constrained WLAN AR due to its computational overhead.
It limits the serving capacity of the WLAN ARs and the scalability of the whole
architecture.
A more rational approach to deal with the legacy clients is to perform a simple port
switching on the Wi-Fi ARs and thus decrease the load on the infrastructure. As
the use of the HIP proxy on the ARs does not deliver any additional benefits other
than supporting the legacy clients, it makes sense to replace it with a port switching
technique.
An example of such setup is illustrated in Figure 8.2. An AR routes the traffic from
a HIP-enabled client towards the central HIP gateway establishing a secure tunnel
and filtering the HIP and ESP packets on the HIP-aware AR firewall. At the same
time, a legacy mobile client is routed by the same AR to a demilitarized network
zone and can be served with a lower QoS level (depending on the network policy).
8.3 Experimental testbed
This section presents our experimental testbed. It starts with a description of the
HIP on Linux (HIPL) [1] porting process and highlight the challenges that we con-
fronted during migration to the OpenWrt platform. Next, we show the components
of our network setup and introduce the status of the architecture deployment in the
panOULU WLAN.
8.3.1 Porting HIPL to OpenWrt
We ported the HIPL implementation to two AR models, La Fonera FON2100 and
Gateworks Avila GW2348-4, both running the OpenWrt Linux distribution.
Porting of HIPL to the OpenWrt platform was not a straightforward process and
required efforts with both AR models. Among the problems we faced were various
memory management issues, missing dependencies, and hardware constraints. We
have chosen OpenWrt as a reference Linux distribution because of its wide range of
supported hardware platforms. Fortunately, OpenWrt is known for its good support
of FON and Gateworks boards. Another consideration was a large and growing
community of developers that work on the OpenWrt project.
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During the HIPL software migration to OpenWrt we detected several critical bugs
that were hard to locate and eliminate. Besides that, we rewrote a number of
parts of the HIPL code completely to avoid library dependencies. For instance, we
needed to reimplement the list data structures to remove glib library dependencies.
Interestingly, the HIPL code running on ARM processor (Avila) required static
typecasting to the character pointer type for memory copy operations. Otherwise,
we were getting ambiguous results; as an example, we have observed that copying
of the in6 addr structure would copy correctly only 96 bits and fill the rest of the
structure with zeroes.
As a summary, porting of the current HIPL implementation to other architectures
supported by the OpenWrt platform should be feasible, but researchers can en-
counter problems related to a specific platform. Since HIPL is not included in the
OpenWrt distributions, it should be compiled with an OpenWrt SDK and the HIPL
patches that are publicly available.
8.3.2 Experimental setup
Our network setup (see Figure 8.2) comprised a set of the Wi-Fi ARs running a HIP-
based distributed firewall. The first AR model we used was La Fonera FON2100 that
has 16 MB of RAM, 8 MB of Flash memory, and a 32-bit MIPS processor running
at 183 MHz. The second model, Gateworks Avila GW2348-4, is more powerful than
the previous one, combining on an average-sized board 128 MB of RAM, 32 MB of
Flash, and a 533-MHz Intel CPU.
Another component of the implemented architecture was a central HIP proxy server,
a desktop-like PC, that acted as the main gateway for the whole WLAN network
connecting it to the Internet. In addition, the testbed included a remote peer
and a number of mobile clients ranging from a Nokia 810 Internet Tablet and a
Symbian S60 smartphone to a mini-laptop ASUS Eee PC 901. There were both
HIP-aware and non-HIP hosts among these mobile devices. The clients used two
publicly available HIP implementations, HIPL and OpenHIP [2]. All components of
our experimental testbed for distributed user authentication in a wireless network
are illustrated in Figure 8.2.
8.3.3 Considerations for deployment
Our system works in a way that the HIP-enabled users establish an association with
the central HIP proxy server by performing a HIP base exchange. Each packet
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sent from a mobile client is filtered by the distributed firewall running on the HIP
Wi-Fi ARs based on the source and destination HITs. Such scenario provides mul-
tiple benefits, including strong user authentication to the WLAN network and HIP
terminal mobility. In addition, all transmitted data is protected by IPsec.
On the other hand, if there is a need for an incremental architecture deployment in
a large public WLAN network, such as panOULU, our architecture can be easily
extended to provide backward compatibility for the legacy clients. This can be
realized by a simple port switching technique on the Wi-Fi ARs as described in
Section 8.2.5.
Ideally, we recommend to deploy the complete architecture at once so that each
WLAN user becomes HIP-aware and is able to authenticate itself to the network.
We believe that universal client authentication would significantly reduce the prob-
ability of a network abuse. However, we admit that in practical situations for large
operator environments an incremental deployment is more feasible. In such cases,
the operator may provide backward compatibility for a certain transition period
needed to install HIP on the legacy client terminals.
8.3.4 Deployment status in panOULU
Deployment of our authentication architecture in panOULU, a city-wide WLAN
in Finland, is in its initial phase. We have installed an HTTP/HIP proxy on the
main network gateway. The proxy allows the mobile clients understanding HIP to
establish secure HIP associations with the central gateway. The proxy authenticates
the clients to the network, provides terminal mobility and encrypts user data over
an unprotected wireless link. Our preliminary tests showed that a mobile HIP user
can successfully connect to the panOULU network, secure the browsing sessions by
constructing an IPsec tunnel with the central HIP proxy server and keep the sessions
ongoing while changing the network attachment point.
As the next step, we added a La Fonera FON2100 AR to panOULU with the running
HIP firewall and proxy extensions. Initial experimentation indicated that limited
hardware resources of this AR model are stressed by the HIP proxy component that,
in turn, is not able to serve many clients simultaneously. In the future, based on the
performance comparison of different Wi-Fi AR models, we plan to choose the most
suitable hardware and continue deployment of our architecture in the panOULU
network.
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8.4 Performance evaluation
This section presents our initial measurement results on two Wi-Fi AR models with
different hardware resources, La Fonera FON2100 (from now onwards Fonera) and
Gateworks Avila GW2348-4 (from now onwards Avila). The results have been
measured in two modes with each AR running as a HIP proxy and a HIP firewall.
HIP involves public-key cryptography and IPsec encryption that can easily stress
lightweight resources of Wi-Fi ARs. One of our objectives was to evaluate the impact
of such computationally-intensive operations on the performance of our authentica-
tion architecture. Our previous work [54, 53], which studied HIP performance on
the Linux-based Nokia Internet Tablets and Symbian smartphones, served as a good
reference for performance evaluation in this article. In addition, HIP has been evalu-
ated on stationary Internet hosts with conventional PC-like resources [40, 38, 48, 87].
We have made an interesting observation that 100% CPU utilization does not nec-
essarily indicate a performance issue for a particular mobile device. Rather, this can
be interpreted as the utilization of all available resources by running applications
when the system allocates maximum capacity to them. We have noticed that when
all applications are in the idle state, the CPU utilization is about 1%. However,
upon invoking a resource-demanding application, the system will release all available
CPU cycles to it. On the other hand, with multiple applications running in parallel,
the Linux scheduler guarantees no starvation for each task by fairly allocating the
time slices.
8.4.1 Firewall mode
This section contains an analysis of our measurement results on Fonera and Avila
running in the HIP firewall mode.
A HIP-enabled firewall on a Wi-Fi AR does not require running the HIP daemon,
unless the HIP daemon itself is used for user registration or similar tasks. In our
experiments, we ran only the HIP-enabled firewall as the crucial component in our
architecture.
Figures 8.3a and 8.3b illustrate the copying task of a 30-MB file over SSH and HIP,
while the traffic was being filtered on the Wi-Fi access routers in the middle. The
ACL on the Wi-Fi AR contained four rules. The first peak on both graphs (the
time interval from the first to the sixth second in Figure 8.3a; the time interval from
the first to the fourth second in Figure 8.3b) corresponds to the HIP base exchange
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Figure 8.3: CPU load in the firewall mode.
between the mobile client and the default gateway in the network. The BEX packets
were filtered by the firewall on the Wi-Fi AR based on HITs. The second peak on the
graphs (the 19th second in Figure 8.3a; the seventh second in Figure 8.3b) accounts
for the SSH key exchange between the mobile client and a remote peer. Finally, the
interval from the 23rd to the 42nd second in Figure 8.3a and from the 10th to the
20th second in Figure 8.3b corresponds to the filtering of the ESP packets by the
firewall. As the figures show, Avila significantly outperforms Fonera in terms of the
time required to complete the whole task, spending in total twice as fewer seconds
as Fonera (20 versus 42 seconds). This result indicates that faster AR hardware is
necessary to provide sufficient performance of filtering operations in a distributed
HIP-based firewall.
Our results on memory utilization in the firewall mode ensure a good level of perfor-
mance on both AR models. We found that although only 1 MB of RAM is available
after the firewall start-up on Fonera, it is sufficient to sustain two-three mobile
clients. With Avila, the situation is better as only 21 MB of the total 128 MB of
RAM are used on the average. Thus, the amount of RAM in the access router does
not make a significant impact on the firewall performance.
8.4.2 Proxy mode
This section presents the results obtained on Fonera and Avila running in the HIP
proxy mode. Figures 8.4a and 8.4b depict the CPU utilization during the bulk
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Figure 8.4: CPU load in the proxy mode.
copy of the same file over SSH as in the previous experiment. Please note that the
plots do not give the CPU load per application but instead for the whole system.
Assuming that other applications are in the idle state, our scenario suggests that
the dynamics of the CPU utilization on the graphs account for the HIP daemon and
the proxy. For both experiments with Fonera and Avila the setup and the size of
the transmitted file were identical.
The difference with previous test is the following. A mobile client in this experiment
is HIP-unaware, hence the proxy on the Wi-Fi AR performs the packet translation.
Prior to the translation the proxy does a HIP base exchange with the default network
gateway. The BEX consumes all available CPU cycles on Fonera for a period of five
seconds (the first peak in Figure 8.4a), while on Avila the same operations result
in less than 40% of the CPU utilization (the first peak in Figure 8.4b). After the
BEX is completed, the HIP proxy on the Wi-Fi AR translates the plain TCP/IP
packets it receives from the mobile client to the ESP packets it sends to the network
gateway. As can be seen from the figures, the whole task is completed on Avila
within 55 seconds. Fonera, on the contrary, due to limited resources spends on this
operation more than 120 seconds.
Since the operations of packet translation require additional work (such as mem-
ory copying, database lookup, encryption operations, etc.), the throughput of the
network is influenced by the amount of the available CPU cycles. We compared
the TCP data throughput of the channel between the mobile client and the cen-
tral network gateway with Avila running in the middle as a firewall and a proxy.
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The results show that the HIP-aware firewall does not seriously affect the data
rate, but the HIP proxy on Avila reduces the throughput by 8.7 Mbps (from 13.1
to 4.4 Mbps). In general, our measurements show that Avila offers a substantial
increase in throughput in comparison to Fonera.
The memory usage becomes an issue when the HIP daemon is running in the proxy
mode. In contrast to the firewall mode, 1 MB of available RAM on Fonera after
the HIP daemon and proxy have been invoked is not sufficient. Due to absence
of a swapping partition on the OpenWrt platform, the lack of RAM makes Fonera
completely unresponsive with the only option of hard reset to bring it back. In
contrast, the HIP proxy running on Avila with a notably larger amount of RAM can
sustain several connections without problems. Though, when every packet is served
in FIFO manner, per-packet processing time affects the overall system throughput.
8.4.3 Mode selection
The analysis of the measurement results allows us to give the following recommen-
dations on deploying the architecture proposed in this article:
• For the areas with a small rate of connections, it is sufficient to have low cost
devices such as La Fonera FON2100 to authenticate the users using HIT-
based filtering on the distributed firewalls (i.e., running a HIP-aware firewall
only).
• Since running only the HIP firewall does not require much of resources, one
may consider using the existing Wi-Fi access routers but only modifying the
software that is pre-installed on these devices.
• In cases when support for both plain unauthenticated and HIP authenti-
cated traffic is needed (i.e., support for both legacy and HIP clients dur-
ing the network transition state), more powerful devices such as Gateworks
Avila GW2348-4 are required. However, even on powerful Wi-Fi ARs we
recommend replacing a HIP proxy with another technique (e.g., forwarding
packets to a demilitarized zone) to provide compatibility with legacy clients.
8.5 Summary
We have proposed a HIP-based distributed authentication architecture that can of-
fer means to solve security and mobility issues in WLAN networks. The proposed
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design is a two-level architecture where mobile users employ the Host Identity Pro-
tocol to connect to legacy Internet hosts through an operator’s WLAN. The system
includes an operator-specific proxy server and a distributed firewall running directly
on WLAN ARs. The architecture has been implemented and validated on two
different AR models with a Linux-based OpenWrt distribution.
Performance measurement results of HIP proxy and firewall running on the OpenWrt
WLAN access routers have supported the motivation behind the two-level architec-
ture. The hardware capabilities of the tested WLAN ARs are sufficient to run the
HIP firewall performing a simple verification of the traffic based on the users’ HITs.
This prevents a malicious user from attacking the operator’s internal infrastructure.
Resource-intensive operations, such as serving as a HIP proxy and a target of the
HIP base exchange, are given to a powerful server running in the fixed operator’s
network. The proxy enables a mobile user to benefit from the HIP properties such
as IPsec encryption, mobility and multihoming, and IP cross-family support. The
proposed architecture is planned to be deployed in a city-wide WLAN network in
Northern Finland (panOULU).
9 Discussion
In this chapter we discuss the results of our empirical research. We provide our evalu-
ation of feasibility of running the existing IP-based mobility and security mechanisms
on lightweight hardware and make recommendations on the use of unmodified HIP
on such devices. We conclude the chapter by discussing several prospective research
directions.
9.1 HIP applicability to lightweight devices
In general, the obtained results indicate that the public-key cryptography and
IPsec encryption involved with HIP are computationally expensive operations for
lightweight mobile handhelds and can produce considerable delays to their users.
Such operations can easily stress CPU, memory and battery resources of the devices
such as the Nokia 770 and the Nokia E51 . However, this is a general statement
and in practice the applicability of unmodified HIP to the resource-constrained mo-
bile phones and PDAs should be considered depending on the QoS requirements of
particular applications.
As an example, we conclude that unmodified HIP can be used in scenarios where
a HIP-enabled mobile client communicates with remote Internet hosts through a
single proxy server. In such a case, the establishment of a HIP association using the
1024-bit RSA keys takes 1.4 seconds on the average including two RTT of 2.5 ms
for the Nokia 770 Internet Tablet. Since one HIP base exchange with the proxy
is sufficient for the whole browsing session, most users will probably tolerate this
delay. We make such conclusion based on the Nielsen’s usability book [78], where
the author elaborates on the “0.1/1/10”rule for the interactive applications, studied
earlier by Miller [69] and Card et al. [11]. According to this rule, in 0.1 second
the user should get a feedback showing that her action (e.g., a mouse click) was
received; in 1 second the task should be completed to avoid the interruption of
the user’s work, otherwise an indicator with the task’s completeness status should
appear on the screen; finally, if in 10 seconds the task is not completed, the user
loses her attention and most likely stops the task or switches to another one [78].
Based on this rule and assuming that each mobile application has an indicator (e.g.,
a status bar) for the completeness of a task, a 1.4 seconds-delay introduced by the
HIP base exchange should not seriously decrease the user attention.
Nevertheless, the situation is likely to change when either two lightweight devices
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communicate with each other through HIP or the client does not use proxy and,
thus, needs to establish several associations with remote sites simultaneously. Our
tests show that the time needed to set up a HIP association between two Nokia 770
Internet Tablets is above 2.6 seconds on the average and between two Nokia E51
smartphones varies from 3.5 to 6.4 seconds depending on the phone state (active
or standby). The phone state is called active when its display is switched on and
refreshing. In this state, a HIP base exchange duration representing a delay for the
user is almost twice as long as in the standby state (3.2 versus 1.7 seconds). Because
the user of a mobile phone most probably uses HIP with a GUI application that
turns the phone into the active state, a HIP association establishment will always
produce a three-second delay for the users of smartphones such as the Nokia E51.
The duration of a HIP mobility update on lightweight devices might be another con-
cern if HIP is used with an application or a protocol that requires fast handovers.
An update of a single HIP association between the Nokia 770 Internet Tablet and a
remote peer takes 287 ms on the average with the RTT equal to 3.75 ms. Hence, the
applications requiring the handoffs faster than this cannot efficiently utilize secure
HIP mobility on such class of devices. Otherwise, this will likely cause poor perfor-
mance and negative user experience. In case of a number of running applications and
several open HIP associations, the mobile client will need to perform multiple update
procedures upon changing its network attachment point, thus requiring even shorter
delay per update. For comparison, a HIP mobility update between a 1.6-GHz IBM
laptop and a server takes only 100 ms on the average with RTT equal to 1.6 ms.
It is worth noting that these mobility measurements were performed 2,5 years ago
with a code snapshot available at the time, so today’s numbers might slightly change
with the present implementations. In general, our experiments showed well a ratio
between the handover durations on the lightweight Nokia 770 and a conventional
IBM laptop.
One way to affect the application delay introduced by HIP is to adjust different
parameters such as the length of a public key (RSA or DSA), the Diffie-Hellman
key length and the puzzle difficulty. For instance, for applications that do not require
strong security (e.g., web surfing) the duration of a HIP association establishment
between a Nokia 770 and a server might be reduced to 0.4 seconds by using the
768-bit DH Group in the Diffie-Hellman key exchange and the 1024-bit RSA keys.
Similarly, one might use a 512-bit RSA key instead of a 1024-bit key. However,
reducing the key lengths is rather unfavourable solution because it would result in a
less secure communication context increasing the probability of attacks. Contrary,
one might want to increase the length of the RSA and DH keys in an untrustworthy
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environment. This in turn will cause even longer delays to exchange four HIP BEX
and three mobility update packets.
Our measurements with different values of the puzzle difficulty showed that reduc-
ing the default value of K = 10 does not significantly decrease processing time of
such a puzzle by the Initiator whereas raising it to K = 15 and above increases the
processing time exponentially on the Nokia 770 Internet Tablet. As an enhance-
ment for parameter adjustments, it would be useful to have a mechanism that can
automatically detect the type of the client hardware prior to communications and
depending on the available resources offer to lightweight peers smaller key lengths
and puzzle difficulty value.
Taking into consideration the CPU utilization perspective our results with a
Symbian-based Nokia E51 indicate a 100% processor load during the intensive HIP
daemon operations such as initial generation of a public-private key pair and estab-
lishment of a HIP association. Otherwise, after the base exchange is completed and
the HIP daemon falls into the standby mode, the CPU utilization is minimal. The
memory usage on the Nokia E51 in our experiments proved to be within normal
bounds during the HIP base exchange raising the total amount of used RAM by
only 3-4 MB on the average.
In another set of the experiments we evaluated the impact of the IPsec ESP data
encryption involved with HIP on RTT and TCP throughput. In general, the RTT
with ESP was slightly higher than over plain IP, except for the first RTT that
triggered a HIP base exchange (that value was over 1 second and we did not include
it in the calculated average). With the initial RTT=2.08 ms, the ESP encryption
increased this value by just 0.67 ms. It would be unfair to generalize these results
because the RTT differs in different networks.
The maximum achievable TCP throughput in our experiments with the Nokia 770
over a wireless link was initially constrained either by improper driver implementa-
tion, low CPU power or another reason. An average value of 4.86 Mbps appeared to
be an upper bound for the Internet Tablet in an encryption-free network. The use
of HIP and ESP further reduced the throughput measured with iperf by 1.59 Mbps.
We also compared ESP with WPA encryption enabled on the wireless access router.
Implemented on hardware WPA expectedly produced tiny impact as compared to
software-based IPsec ESP. The comparison with a 1.6-GHz IBM laptop showed that
HIP affects more seriously devices with low computational power. The experiments
with the Nokia 770 and the laptop were performed in equal or similar conditions.
Hence we assume that the difference in numbers obtained on both devices shows
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us the pure effect of IPsec ESP encryption. However, we did not control all factors
that could potentially affect the measurements results. For instance, we assumed
that the WLAN signal strength was merely equal on both Nokia tablet and IBM
laptop connected to the same Wi-Fi AR and placed in the same proximity from it.
Yet we did not measure the actual signal strength and cannot provide any numbers.
Similarly, we did not control different TCP options that can affect the throughput.
Ideally, it is necessary to distinguish the effects on the throughput made by the
application, by TCP itself and by the network channel [94]. Due to its complexity,
we leave such analysis out of the thesis’s scope.
Our preliminary results on power consumption indicate that the use of ESP encryp-
tion with HIP does not notably affect the current consumption on the Nokia 770,
although the energy cost per byte is higher with HIP due to reduced throughput. We
noticed that the Tablet’s CPU is always fully utilized when an application transmits
data over WLAN, and this depletes the battery in 3-4 hours. The measurements
of power consumption and evaluation of the HIP effect on the battery lifetime on
Nokia E51 showed 222 mW/60 mA and 333 mW/90 mA for the cases when the
phone was in the ”normal” use (i.e., no HIP daemon was running) and with the HIP
daemon doing a base exchange. The observed values correspond to 18 and 12 hours
of a 1050-mAh battery. In reality, the constant exchange of the HIP control pack-
ets is abnormal behaviour of the HIP daemon, so the purpose of these results is
rather to illustrate an instant power consumption by the cryptography operations
constituting the BEX.
9.2 Future research directions
The existing mobile phones, PDAs, Wi-Fi routers, remote controllers, sensors and
many other embedded appliances in our daily life are increasingly utilizing the
TCP/IP communication stack to interconnect between each other. This tendency
has received its own definition - the ”Internet of Things” [42], which considers any
small object as a potential participant of a physical IP network. Originating from
the early 2000s, the idea of the ”Internet of Things” heavily relies on two important
domains: how to identify objects and detect their changes, and how to connect them.
The first domain is to a large extent based on the RFID and sensor technologies,
whereas the second is attributed to the TCP/IP communication stack.
In this thesis, we addressed selected important security and mobility issues of the
mobile Internet. In particular, we empirically evaluated the applicability of the Host
Identity Protocol to three classes of lightweight devices including a Linux-based
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PDA, a Symbian-based smartphone and two models of the OpenWrt-based Wi-Fi
access routers. Since these devices are a definite part of the future all-IP networks,
we classify our present work to fall into the communication domain of the ”Internet
of Things”. As a part of the future research, we consider important to further
investigate this emerging concept by focusing on its two domains: identification and
access control for the embedded objects and secure communications between them.
As an example, the applicability of existing IP security mechanisms to the different
types of sensor networks can be evaluated.
Besides communications security in a network composed of sensors or other
lightweight objects, one important perspective for our future considerations is energy
consumption. While in this work we focused on measuring the effect of public-key
cryptography and IPsec encryption on the battery lifetime of different handhelds,
another factor strongly influencing power consumption of such devices is data trans-
mission over a wireless interface. Ideally, a wireless smart object should stay most
of the time in a sleep mode and wake up for only short periods to exchange data
with its peers. A variety of approaches has been proposed to eliminate idle states of
lightweight objects in wireless ad-hoc networks and thus achieve rational utilization
of their energy resources. A substantial contribution in this area, potentially valu-
able to our future research, belongs to Feeney et al.. In their works [20, 21, 22] the
authors studied multiple power save protocols in wireless networks and evaluated
the impact of different node wakeup algorithms on network capacity and energy
efficiency.
One interesting recent initiative in the field of the ”Internet of Things” is the industry
alliance IPSO (IP for Smart Objects) [18]. IPSO’s mission is to encourage different
organisations and parties in the use of the Internet Protocol as the most standardized
and non-proprietary solution for networking of small objects. IPSO’s activities do
not substitute but complement the work performed by the IETF and IEEE forums
by documenting new IP-based technologies intended for embedded objects, making
interoperability tests between different smart devices, applications and services, and
serving as an informative, promotion and marketing entity [18].
As a potential continuation of our present research and a target for future work,
we consider the (wireless) ”Internet of Things” as an environment where different
embedded devices (from a light bulb to a temperature meter) coexist, are inter-
connected and possibly controlled remotely (e.g., by mobile terminals). In such an
“ecosystem”, we must ensure secure and efficient mobile communications between
all lightweight participants. In achieving this goal, we will most likely need to al-
leviate weaknesses identified in this thesis, e.g., the computational expenses of the
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public-key cryptography and IPsec encryption. The protocols operating in such net-
works should be adaptable to different classes of communicating devices. Further
comparison of our empirical results against related work will provide more insights
into the research target and assist in finding alternative approaches for security on
lightweight mobile devices.
10 Conclusions
In this thesis, we addressed the aspect of secure communications in the mobile Inter-
net. In particular, we considered selected security and mobility issues on lightweight
mobile devices and network components. Our main objectives were to evaluate the
feasibility of running the existing IP-layer security and mobility protocols (such as
HIP and IPsec) on lightweight mobile devices and assess the impact of constrained
hardware resources on performance of the protocols’ operations.
We performed a literature study to obtain the insights into the research target
and evaluated the contribution of the related work. In the empirical part of our
research we conducted a number of experiments involving several mobile clients with
limited CPU, memory and battery resources running the Host Identity Protocol.
We measured a set of different HIP and network-related performance metrics. The
analysis of the results allowed us to make recommendations on using unmodified
public-key cryptography mechanisms on lightweight devices in the mobile Internet.
In addition, we reported our development and porting experience, which can be
useful for migration of OSS projects to an embedded platform.
Our empirical results indicate that unmodified HIP and IPsec are feasible to run
on mobile devices and lightweight network components without a significant per-
formance degradation only in particular cases. That is why the evaluation of HIP
and similar protocols has to distinguish between different scenarios and applications,
taking into account varying QoS requirements.
Our experimentations with two different Wi-Fi access router models showed that the
choice of the AR hardware is dictated by the requirements to the serving capacity
(i.e., the amount of clients) and the underlying network architecture (i.e., which
functions are performed by the Wi-Fi ARs).
One of the important future research direction is to study different IP security
protocols and their adaptability for distinct classes of communicating devices in
the mobile Internet, which can be achieved, e.g., by the use of flexible protocol
parameters. Another approach can be to concentrate on secure communications in
the “Internet of Things” and, in addition to mobile handhelds, consider other smart
objects.
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